East Side Access signalling

The completion of East Side Access marked the first time in decades that the LIRR began service over an entirely new route.  Integrating a new project and new facilities into a very old railroad often requires mixing old and new things to deliver something that takes advantage of new technology to enhance the capability and reliability of the new systems or infrastructure, while not losing too much backwards compatibility with the existing systems and equipment that are used elsewhere on the railroad.  This mix of the old and the new is evident throughout the East Side Access facilities.

A signal at the west end of the GCT platforms
(Photo: The LIRR Today)

One good example of this is the signaling infrastructure used in the tunnels and caverns built as part of the East Side Access project, which is a new type of equipment for the railroad and unique to the Grand Central Branch.

Similar to almost the entire rest of the railroad, the Grand Central Branch uses cab signaling to protect train movements through the area.  The LIRR was one of the first railroads to rollout a robust cab signaling system after a string of catastrophic incidents saw roughly 115 people killed and about 500 injured in three major incidents in 1950, all caused by human factors.  Today, the LIRR's Automated Speed Control (ASC) cab signaling system is in place and protects train movements across most of the railroad, including, now, the Grand Central Branch.

Cab signaling supplements, and between interlockings typically takes the place of, traditional wayside signaling where equipment along the side of the right-of-way visually provides instructions to crews of approaching trains, similar to how traffic lights guide motorists approaching an intersection.  Cab signaling brings that information into the train cab and shows it on a display unit visible to the engineer (and, in some cases, there is equipment that will automatically enforce signal indications and force the train to slow or stop if the signal indications are not being followed, as is the case with the LIRR's ASC system).  While the LIRR for some years operated the ASC cab signal systems in tandem with wayside signals, it removed most wayside signals between interlockings several decades ago (along with most other railroads who implemented similar systems).  The cab signal systems provide the same information with a greater level of safety, and removing intermediate wayside signals cuts down on maintenance costs and points of failure that can cause delays.

The old (position light) and new (tri-color) light
signals during the cutover at Patchogue
(Photo: TrainsAreFun.com)

Unlike Metro-North (which replaced all of its old signals with simplified go-no go signals at interlockings), the LIRR left the full size versions of wayside signals in place at interlockings, as it offered more information to train crews about what was up ahead.  Thus, the LIRR's characteristic position light signals remained visible across the railroad and dominated up through the mid-2000's.

The tradition of using position light signals began to break in the mid-2000's when the Patchogue to Speonk signalization project brought tri-color light signals to the Montauk Branch.  Since then, LIRR has strayed from the path even further, installing G-head signals around HAROLD Interlocking and the adjacent interlockings as part of the East Side Access project.

In the mid-2010's, the LIRR made its first foray into Reduced Aspect Signaling with the Ronkonkoma Branch Double Track project.  Similar to Metro-North's approach, these signals show only limited information (6 indications).

As part of the East Side Access project, the MTA and LIRR also went with reduced aspect signals in the tunnel portions of the project—but continuing the trend of devolving signal hardware into a confusing mess, the signal equipment used and the indications they display in the East Side Access tunnels are different from the reduced aspect signals used elsewhere on the railroad.

The signals used in the East Side Access tunnels bear closer resemblance to transit signals you might see on the Subway or other light rail lines.  They have three colors, green over yellow over red, which are used to show a more limited set of four indications (the red flashes to mean stop and proceed):

Similar to the reduced aspect signals used elsewhere on the railroad, the default indication is just "proceed", meaning the train can move forward at the speed shown by the cab signaling system.  Unlike the full size signals, which can show many more indications that offer the train crew better guidance about how fast they should go now, how fast they can go when they clear the interlocking, and what is coming up ahead, these require the train crews to rely on the cab signal indications.

Within the East Side Access facilities, the LIRR is using dual band cab signaling for the first time, using the relatively newer 250 Hz cab signaling technology in addition to the 100 Hz codes that are used elsewhere on the LIRR, Metro-North, SEPTA, and the NEC.  The 250 Hz band was first introduced by Amtrak in the 1990's as part of the upgrades to support the Acela Express rollout, to allow for the cab signal systems to support train speeds of up to 150 mi/hr.  Codes on the two bands combine to show additional aspects that allow for those higher speeds.  Why this was built out for East Side Access, where the highest MAS is 60 mi/hr, is beyond my reckoning (perhaps they were futureproofing or wanted to test it out when it could be paid for out of the project budget).

Notably, the dual bad ASC in place in the East Side Access tunnels is the primary reason why the M-3 fleet is restricted from operating to/from NY-Grand Central, as the older equipment was not equipped with the technology that can receive the 250 Hz codes (though the 250 Hz system was designed as an overlay to ensure backwards compatibility, if the train reads only the 100 Hz but not the 250 Hz code, then it is still valid, just a slower speed).

Within the GCT caverns/terminal and through the east interlocking limits of GCT 3 and GCT 4 Interlockings (the crossover caverns located immediately east of each station platform), there are no cab signal codes in the rails.  This results in the LIRR's ASC system enforcing a 15 mi/hr limit.

More variation in wayside signal equipment

Diversity is a great thing and very important—but not when it comes to railway signaling hardware.  Having a consistent set of signal hardware across a railroad means that train crews only have to learn one set of signal indications.  But the LIRR has gone from one nearly ubiquitous format (traditional position light signals) to now more than six different types of signal equipment (position lights, tri-color, G-head, Atlantic tunnel, reduced aspect signals, ESA signals), plus an additional type in the East River Tunnels and around NY-Penn Station.

On a trip from Babylon to NY-Grand Central, a train crew will encounter position light signals at Babylon; tri-color light signals at Amityville, Massapequa, and Wantagh; position light signals again at Freeport, Rockville Centre, and Valley Stream; a mix of tri-color light and position light signals around Jamaica; position light signals on the Main Line between Jamaica and Woodside, then G-head signals around WOOD Interlocking, through Woodside and HAROLD Interlocking, and then these new reduced-aspect signals for ESA in the tunnels and interlockings to NY-Grand Central.

This degree of back-and-forth just opens the door to human error and the risk that someone might not quickly and properly recognize a signal indication.  There is further complication now that the new ESA signals have indications that overlap with already existing indications with these other signal types—a single yellow light means "proceed, governed by cab signal indications" (which could be any speed given by the ASC system) in the East Side Access tunnels, but in other places it means "proceed at restricted speed".  A steady green light also means "proceed, governed by cab signal indications" in the ESA territory, but elsewhere it means "proceed at slow speed until clear of interlocking, then at normal", which is extra risky, since someone who mistakes the type of signal could travel too fast within an interlocking if the ASC system is showing a speed more favorable than 15 mi/hr.

The map below shows which type of signal equipment is used where—and, as you can tell, it has become quite a hodgepodge.  LIRR appears to be moving towards standardizing Reduced Aspect Signaling on the Main Line, its branches, and the North Shore, while sticking with the tri-color lights elsewhere on the South Shore and in busier interlockings.  But there's still a mess of differing equipment in the meantime:

Need for Speed: Improving LIRR and Metro-North train speeds

Improving train speeds has been in the news a bit over the past couple of months amid issues with slowdowns and extended travel times, particularly on the NYC Subway.  One of the approaches to addressing this issue at NYCT included the "Save Safe Seconds" campaign, launched as part of the "Fast Forward" plan for NYCT.  Last summer, the MTA announced the creation of a new Train Speed and Safety Task Force (at the Governor's urging) with the charge to "safely address longstanding and unnecessary train slowdowns across the system".  The MTA said that the task force would examine the issue of train speeds not only at NYCT, but also on the LIRR and Metro-North as well.  When task force's final report was published back in December, the report went into great detail about the situation of speeds on the subway and generally reinforced NYCT's already ongoing Save Safe Seconds campaign.  But the report said little to nothing on the state of train speeds on LIRR and Metro-North.  In fact, the only real mention of the two railroads in the report at all was an extremely general recommendation to "determine how analysis set forth in report could be applicable for Metro-North and the Long Island Rail Road".

The MTA declined to respond to questions about train speeds on LIRR or Metro-North, if any speed improvements have been made or are planned for the railroads, or if there will ever be any expansion on the few sentences in the final task force report, despite multiple requests.

It's very unclear what—if any—actions have been taken by the railroads or are planned as result of the Train Speed and Safety task force.  Back in October when the preliminary findings were announced, officials confirmed that the new look at train speeds would also apply to the LIRR, though officials did not offer any details about what that would entail.  At the time, Kevin Sexton, the general chairman of the union that represents LIRR train engineers (the BLE&T), told Newsday that MTA management had not reached out to him about any potential plans to address train speeds on the LIRR.

A permanent speed restriction sign
at East Rockaway
(Photo: The LIRR Today)

There is a clear need to address train speeds on the railroads.  Despite rather limited changes to the physical infrastructure on the LIRR, train speeds have been gradually getting slower over the course of the last decade.  Compared with 2010, roughly 30% of LIRR train running times have gotten longer, by an average of 2.4 minutes (after accounting for added/dropped stops).  Running times have been elongated on 13% of rush hour trains and 37% of off-peak trains compared to 2010.  In many cases, running times have crept upwards gradually...usually as a result of extra time being added to accommodate trackwork or some other schedule change, then never being removed once the project is over.  In other cases, pure schedule padding has been added to make the On-Time Performance numbers look better while not actually getting passengers to their destinations any faster.  As part of "LIRR Forward", the railroad said that it identified the top 20 late trains and "schedules and stopping patterns were adjusted" (page 170)...but that effort consisted almost entirely of adding schedule padding.

In 1933, the LIRR advertised special Fishermans deals on trains to Montauk, with schedules showing trains making the trip from NY-Penn Station to Montauk (with a change at Jamaica) in 2 hours, 30 minutes flat.  Local trains to Montauk were scheduled for 2 hours, 50 minutes in 1936.  Today, those weekend morning express trains to Montauk are scheduled to take about 3 hours, 6 minutes, and weekday rush hour trains take about 3 hours, 15 minutes.  Even today's fastest express train, train 2710 (the off-season version of the Cannonball) takes 2 hours, 32 minutes making only four intermediate stops.  The fact that it takes most trains 30-45 minutes to go from Manhattan to Montauk today than it did in 1933 is certainly not good...

Historical resources: Old LIRR timetables

There are a handful of old timetables floating around on the internet.  Below are some examples.  If you see one listed for your branch, check how much the running times and service patterns have changed between then and now.  You might be surprised!

• Babylon Branch, 1978 (PDF, 15 MB) from lexciestuff.net
• Eastern Long Island (Patchogue/Montauk and Greenport), 1978 (PDF, 13 MB) from lexciestuff.net
• Oyster Bay Branch, 1976 (JPG) from Derek Stadler
• ALL stations and branches, 1997 from LIRR's old website on the Internet Archive
• Various old timetables, from Steve Lynch's LIRR archive

The issue of improving train speeds is a very complex one, and in this area, the subway and the railroads are apples and oranges when it comes to viable approaches to improving speeds.  Nevertheless, it's a topic that should be addressed head on, and (pardon the pun) at great speed.

Before beginning, it’s important to differentiate between maximum speeds and average speeds.  Both are important, but impact how long a train takes to get from point A to point B in different ways.  Increasing maximum speeds can improve travel times, but it is only one part of the equation...there are a number of factors that can result in trains operating well below Maximum Authorized Speed (MAS) over the course of their trip, including the track, civil speed restrictions, signaling systems, the number of stops (including dwell time), schedule padding, and other scheduling deficiencies.  Improving train speeds requires a holistic approach and should involve more than just increasing top speeds on certain segments of track.

Think of it this way: the local residential streets around your house typically have a speed limit of about 30 mi/hr.  Your municipality can come and increase the speed limit to 80 mi/hr, but if there are stop signs or traffic lights at every block that you have to decelerate, stop, and accelerate again for each one, or if there are sharp curves or turns all over the place, the chances of you ever getting up to that 80 mi/hr speed are very slim.

Interactive map: LIRR speed limits

To get an idea of what timetable speed limits are like today, you can check out The LIRR Today's speed limit map.  I'll stress that the map is presented as-is and for informational purposes only.  The map is based on data from around 2012 and while timetable speeds have likely changed very little since then, no representations are made as to its accuracy today.

The following sections outline a couple of the many factors that influence train speeds on mainline railroads in the United States, and some areas where there might be room for improvement...  I will try to stay brief and summary-level for the purposes of this piece, and go into more detail in some of these areas in the coming weeks.

LIRR's 19th Decade, in review...

The 2010's were a period of great activity for the LIRR.  From growing ridership, sluggish expansion progress, vexing reliability problems, slumping satisfaction, and several scandals, the 19th decade of operation for the nation's longest running passenger railroad was anything but mundane.  While the LIRR can stake claim to the titles of the busiest, oldest, and one of the largest passenger railroads in North America, it is also the most expensive...and the railroad struggled significantly to implement real cost controls to bring operating and capital expenses down to manageable levels.

As ridership continues to push steadily upwards, likely pushing past the 90 million mark for 2019, the LIRR celebrated several major anniversaries and milestones over the course of the last decade.  The railroad celebrated its 180th Anniversary in April 2014, entering its 19th decade in operation, and the LIRR also marked 100 years of service to NY-Penn Station, and its current Jamaica station.

The LIRR celebrated its 180th Anniversary in April 2014 (Photo: MTA/Patrick Cashin)

As the regional economy recovered from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, LIRR ridership declines leveled off in 2011 and then proceeded to grow throughout the rest of the decade, posting increases in seven of ten years.  Declining ridership would see LIRR lose its title as the busiest commuter railroad in North America to Metro-North for a few years, it would regain that title again in 2013.  These increases in ridership have been fueled almost exclusively by occasional travelers.  As rush hour service patterns have remained almost exactly the same for 30 years and reliability issues continue to vex the railroad, commuter traffic has actually been declining.  Commuter traffic is on pace to decline for the third straight year in 2019.  While the railroad has not yet confirmed ridership figures for 2019, year-to-date through November ridership is up 1.7% over the prior year.  If that same level of growth continued in the final month of the year, LIRR would have carried roughly 91.3 million passengers.  The LIRR would carry roughly 860 million passengers in the 2010's.

All of those passengers were transported on a total of more than 2.4 million total trains over the course of the decade.  While the 2010 service cuts dealt a big blow to train service in a number of areas, particularly during the off-peak times, the LIRR would slowly restore service as ridership began to rebound starting in 2013, though the number of brand new services introduced over the course of the 2010's is extremely short.  After all of the service subtractions and additions over the course of the decade, the train schedules today look more or less identical to what they were at the start of the decade.

The LIRR would struggle with reliability throughout the entire course of the 2010's, significantly at times.  OTP trended upwards for the first three years of the last decade, reaching a peak of 94.3% in 2012, but that trend would reverse in later years, sinking to a low of 90.4% in 2018. While final OTP figures for 2019 have yet to be confirmed, the railroad is on track to post a notable improvement in reliability for the fist time since 2016.  The railroad did not meet its systemwide 95.1% OTP goal (lowered to 94.0% in 2015) in any one year during the 2010's.  In total, roughly 185,000 trains would arrive at their final destinations late, including more than 17,000 canceled or partially canceled trains over the course of the decade, giving the LIRR an overall systemwide OTP for the entire decade of roughly 92.4%, or 1.6% below the current lowered goal.

Riders became less and less satisfied with LIRR service over the course of the 2010's.  While the LIRR reported 89% satisfaction in 2010, that would gradually trend downwards over the course of the decade, dropping precipitously to 77% in 2017, and declining further to 76% in 2018.  The results for 2019 have not yet been released.  The results for last year (which were taken at about the one-year mark for "LIRR Forward") will be a big tell if the railroad's efforts to improve service are actually registering with riders.  While the railroad has generally credited these declines to fluctuating reliability, the trend downward has been rather consistent across the board.  Of the 53 survey questions that had been asked continuously since 2010, responses in all but three of them were lower in 2018 than they were at the start of the decade.  Satisfaction in six categories is more than 20% lower than it was in 2010, primarily those related to train and station restroom cleanliness.

While the 2010's did see significant capital investment in the LIRR, with the railroad seeing a grand total of more than $15 billion in capital investment as part of the MTA's 2010-2014 and 2015-2019 Capital Programs.  However, most of the projects that have been completed are predominately rehabilitative in nature, with only limited new expansions of double tracking or signalization accomplished during the 2010's.  The LIRR opened zero new stations, placed zero new route miles of track into service, and extended electrification by zero miles.

On the subject of capital expansion, the 2010's saw the furtherance of the biggest debacle of them all: East Side Access.  Originally expected to be completed in 2009 for the cost of $4.3 billion, the project is now entering its third decade of issues and delays. At the beginning of the 2010's, East Side Access was supposed to be completed in 2013 for the cost of $6.3 billion.  In 2018, the MTA amended its full funding grant agreement to push the completion date to December 2023 and the cost to $12.018 billion, though the agency has continued to say publicly the project will be completed in 2022.  While we were waiting for the LIRR to grow larger for the first time in decades, the LIRR's route mileage shrunk over the course of the 2010's.  Passenger service was discontinued on the Lower Montauk Branch in November 2012 (though Hurricane Sandy brought that forward to late October), and the LIRR formally abandoned the Montauk Cutoff and Main Line Cutoff on March 11, 2016.

The first three years of the last decade saw tropical cyclone hit near to Long Island, with dramatically increasing impacts: Tropical Storm Earl in 2010, Tropical Storm Irene in 2011, and Hurricane Sandy in 2012.  Following the landfall of Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, the LIRR ran no trains for more than two days, and restoring the full compliment of weekday trains took weeks.  We are even still dealing with the consequences of Hurricane Sandy today, and will likely continue to do so throughout the course of the 2020's as restoration and resiliency projects continue both on Long Island, and in the East River Tunnels to NY-Penn Station.

The LIRR was no stranger to scandal over the course of the last decade.  From federal prosecutors busting open the wide-ranging disability scandal in the first part of the decade, to the controversy surrounding overtime that the MTA is struggling with agency-wide now, a cloud of waste, fraud, and abuse continues to loom over the railroad.

The last decade also saw the LIRR very slowly move into the 21st Century.  From the launch of the CooCoo text service for train schedules in 2010, to the pilot and eventual expansion of TrainTime in the first half of the decade, and more recently making better real-time train information available to passengers through more means (including through the wider use of GPS).  However, the railroad continues to be very slow to reform decades-old (and, in some cases, centuries-old) practices in many key areas.

LIRR fares increased significantly over the course of the decade, with five fare increases happening, on average, once every other year over the course of the decade.  At the start of the decade in 2010, a monthly ticket to/from zone 7 cost $232...now it is up to $308, an increase of 33%.  Fare increases outpaced the rate of inflation by more than 10% over the course of the decade.  Despite significant increases in fares and subsidies to the MTA, and a continuing strong economy following the recovery from the financial crisis, the MTA's operating budget enters 2020 under significant financial stress, with the agency projecting a $433 million deficit by 2023 (after taking into account the effects of the MTA transformation plan).

As the LIRR continues a period of record capital investment, including billions being spent on East Side Access and the Main Line Grade Crossing Elimination project, the finish line for these decade-old projects are finally in site in the early part of the 2020's, which will hopefully allow for the realization of long-promised and significantly overdue service improvements, including direct one-seat rides to Manhattan's east side for the very first time.

As LIRR plows full speed ahead into the 2020's, click "Continue Reading »" below to take a look back at some of the highlights (and lowlights) of the LIRR in the 2010's.  The list is in no way complete, but tries to capture some of the major events that shaped the nation's oldest and busiest railroad over the course of the last 10 years.  Note: if you subscribe via e-mail or RSS, I recommend you continue reading in your web browser to make sure nothing got lost in the re-formatting.

FRA abandons two-person crew rule

The short version:

The FRA has withdrawn a proposed rule that would have mandated minimum train crew sizes on railroads in the United States.  FRA was unable to find any conclusive evidence that one-person train operations are any less safe than multiple person crews, and determined that a train crew staffing rule would unnecessarily impede the future of rail innovation and automation.  After closely examining the issue, FRA determined that issuing any regulation requiring a minimum number of train crewmembers would not be justified because such a regulation is unnecessary for a railroad operation to be conducted safely at this time.

In withdrawing the proposed rule, FRA is providing notice of its affirmative decision that no regulation of train crew staffing is necessary or appropriate.  FRA's election to abandon the proposed rule and not regulate train crew sizes is also intended to preempt any current or proposed state laws mandating minimum train crew staffing in any manner under 49 USC 20106 and its judicial construction.

The FRA's decision to abandon the rule affirms that there are not (nor can there be) any legal or regulatory obstacles to one-person train operation on railroads in the United States.

The Federal Railroad Administration is abandoning a rule first proposed in 2016 that would have regulated train crew staffing, including mandating a minimum of at least two person crews to operate all trains.  The withdrawal of the proposed rule was made official through the publication of this notice in the Federal Register on May 29, 2019.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was first proposed in March 2016, proposing regulations establishing minimum requirements for the size of train crew staffs depending on the type of operation.  The rule was proposed after two major rail accidents in 2013, the Lac-Mégantic crude oil train derailment outside Quebec, Canada, and the derailment, collision, and subsequent explosion of two BNSF freight trains outside Casselton, North Dakota.  As a result of these accidents, the FRA Rail Safety Advisory Committee was tasked with studying "appropriate train crew sizes", but the RASC was unable to identify any conclusive statistical data to suggest there are any safety risks to one-person crew operations.

The FRA says it issued the NPRM in order to give "the broader public an opportunity to provide input  on this issue".  FRA says it received nearly 1,600 comments on the NPRM from various stakeholders and individuals, as well as the National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates major rail accidents.  While many of the comments, particularly those from the railroad unions and current/former/retired train crew members, generally supported the idea of minimum train crew sizes, most of the comments "largely provided anecdotal information" on why they thought one-person train operations were unsafe and not any hard evidence that multiple-person crews were safer.  The FRA also received comments from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and other entities opposing the proposed rule, commenting in part that the FRA's standing for proposing the rule in the first place was "arbitrary", due to a lack of data indicating its need (which the FRA admitted in the 2016 notice).  The AAR funded two studies, which concluded that safety data analyses show one-person crew operations "appear as safe as multiple-person crew operations, if not safer" and that the proposed rule would greatly impact the ability of US railroads to control operating costs without making the industry safer.  The second study, which compared practices on European railways, and found that European rail operations are comparable to US operations and therefore the successes of the European network in implementing one-person train operations can serve as a model for the US rail system.  A comparative risk assessment also submitted by the AAR found "almost no difference in accident rates between one- and two-person operations where PTC has been fully implemented."

In withdrawing its proposed rule, FRA states:

"FRA finds that no regulation of train crew staffing is necessary or appropriate at this time... Moreover, despite studying the issue in-depth and performing extensive outreach to industry stakeholders and the general public, FRA's statement in the NPRM that it 'cannot provide reliable or conclusive statistical data to suggest whether one-person crew operations are generally safer or less safe than multiple-person crew operations' still holds true today.  Accordingly, FRA withdraws the NPRM."

The FRA's withdrawal notice points out that none of the circumstances from the two accidents that instigated the proposed rule suggested that increased crew redundancy would have made any difference, and are "tangential at best and do not provide a sufficient basis for FRA regulation of train crew staffing requirements."  The FRA feels that other actions taken following these two train crashes sufficiently address safety risks exposed in these incidents.

The FRA also determined that rail safety data does not support a train crew staffing rulemaking.  The NTSB concurs with that conclusion, stating in its report regarding the derailment of Amtrak train 188 that:

"There is insufficient data to demonstrate that accidents are avoided by having a second qualified person in the cab.  In fact, the NTSB has investigated numerous accidents in which both qualified individuals in a two-person crew made mistakes and failed to avoid an accident."

As part of its withdrawal of the proposed rule, FRA affirms unequivocally that there are no legal or regulatory obstacles to one-person train operations on railroads in the United States.  The FRA even went one-step further, stating that there are no legal or regulatory restrictions to zero-person train operations in the event autonomous technology were to be developed to operate a train in lieu of a certified locomotive engineer.

Lastly, the FRA's withdrawal of the proposed rule is also intended to preempt all current or proposed state laws attempting to regulate train crew staffing in any manner (the rule mentions that California, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Ohio, Oregon, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington have some sort of regulation or restrictions in place, and that approximately 30 other states, including New York, have proposed laws since 2015).  The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (repealed and recodified as 49 USC 20106) mandates that laws, regulations, and orders "related to railroad safety" be nationally uniform.  The FRSA and its judicial construction directs that in cases where FRA has declined to regulate a particular aspect of railroad safety, no state law can cover that same subject matter.

The withdrawal of this proposed rule is very good news for regional rail systems, as this keeps the path towards one-person train operations clear.  The LIRR currently staffs each train with at leas three crew members (an engineperson, conductor, and assistant conductor), plus as many as 6 additional collectors, significantly driving up operating costs, especially compared to railroads elsewhere in the world that manage to run trains safely with one-person crews.  The LIRR, for example, spent $247 million in 2018 employing conductors.  With the proposed rule abandoned, there continue to be no obstacles to the LIRR implementing a proof of payment fare system and eliminating conductors, allowing for substantial reductions in operating costs and enabling significant increases in train service.

Steps to Strike: Self-help under the Railway Labor Act

I have gotten several questions over the last couple of days about collective bargaining negotiation process, and the timeline the process follows.  MTA management and most of the collective bargaining units have been at odds recently over a spat regarding overtime policies and practices.

There are two main statutes under which collective bargaining is regulated at the MTA: the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA), which applies to railroads, and the Taylor Law (with the Triborough Amendment) (TL-TA), which applies to employees covered under the NYS Civil Service Law.  Both of these laws are designed to prevent disruption to industries by stipulating certain conditions that have to be met or actions that have to be taken before one side resorts to self-help (in the case of the Taylor Law, self-help is not allowed at all).

Railway Labor Act	Taylor Law and Triborough Amendment
Federal statute passed in 1926, amended in 1934 and 1936, that applies to mainline railroads engaged in interstate commerce.	State statute passed in 1967, Triborough Amendment passed in 1982, that is an extension of the NYS Civil Service Law.
Applies to MTA LIRR, Metro-North, and SIRTOA employees.	Applies to NYS civil service employees, including most represented employees at MTA HQ, NYCT, MaBSTOA,  Bus Company, TBTA. FMTAC, and MTA CC administration.
Requires arbitration for minor disputes, mediation for major disputes.  After being released from mediation, sides may agree to arbitration or declare an impasse and take steps towards self-help.	Vests power to administer law in matters related to major disputes in the Public Employment Relations Board, which mediates disputes between represented employees and their employers. Self-help is not allowed.
Contracts remain in force until a new agreement is reached.	Contracts remain in force until a new agreement is reached. The Triborough Amendment requires employers to continue increasing wages at the same rate as under the previous contract.

The Taylor Law effectively bans self-help by public employees, and imposes penalties on parties that break the law and engage in unauthorized job actions.  The Railway Labor Act, which applies to the mainline railroads, does allow self-help after a mediation process has been followed and exhausted.  "Self-help" can typically take one of three forms:

• Strike by employees, where workers walk off the job and refuse to work.  Under the RLA, a union must be able to prove support of a strike from more than 50% of an entire class of represented employees (not just those who chose to vote).  Under the TA-TL, strikes are not permitted, and union officials and employees who illegally strike face sanctions, including potential criminal or civil charges and reductions in pay.
• Lockout by management, where workers are denied employment and not permitted to work.  Under the RLA, these are rare.
• Unilateral imposition of terms by management, where management can at its sole option modify terms (e.g. freeze or reduce wages, alter working conditions, modify or eliminate benefits, etc.), to the extent allowable by law.  This almost always results in employees moving to strike.

This will focus on the the application of the Railway Labor Act for the railroads, and the resolution of major disputes.  The RLA defines minor disputes as disagreements over the interpretation or application of terms in the collective bargaining agreement.  These disagreements are arbitrable, and the National Labor Relations Board (or a similar board) considers the disputes and renders a determination that both parties must abide by.

For those unfamiliar with the difference between the terms arbitration and mediation, both work more or less in the same way, where a panel of people consider the facts of the case and are supposed to determine a fair and equitable solution in a neutral manner.  The major difference is in arbitration, the determination is generally binding—meaning the arbitrators determine what's fair, and both sides must abide by the outcome.  Mediation is generally not biding—the mediators work with both sides to find common ground and facilitate negotiations, often presenting potential resolutions they think is fair and reasonable.  The two sides may agree to adopt all or part of the mediator's proposals, or they can take the report and immediately discard it...it's entirely up to them to decide on how to proceed.

The collective bargaining process under the RLA starts with the party seeking to modify contract terms notifying the other in writing, often referred to as the "section 6 notice", specifying the desired changes.  That kicks off the negotiation process.

This process can be interrupted at any point in time when the two sides reach an agreement.  Under the RLA, all contracts remain in full force and are amendable until a new agreement is made or one side resorts to self-help.  If you ever hear about employees "working without a contract for __ years", that is simply not true—employees area always covered under their previous collective bargaining agreement, even after it expires, until a new agreement is reached.  If either side tries to circumvent these processes and seek self-help prematurely, the courts may enjoin to stop the job action (and may impose penalties on the side that jumped the gun).  Only Congress may directly intervene in this process and avert self-help (under their charge to regulate interstate commerce).  Congress may by resolution impose whatever contract terms they want, effectively resetting the whole collective bargaining timeline, though Congress has generally declined to intervene in labor disputes in recent decades, including the 2014 LIRR contract dispute.

The graphic below illustrates the general process by which collective bargaining follows under the Railway Labor Act:

There is no set timeline for the entire process to play out.  The main wildcard is the time the parties spend in negotiations before the National Mediation Board...there is no minimum or maximum time negotiations can take place before the NMB, so it can be weeks, months, or even years— and only the NMB may release the parties from mediation.  After the parties are released from mediation, they can continue to negotiate or declare an impasse.

The declaration of an impasse in negotiations is what really starts the clock.  From that point on, the process generally takes about 270 days to play out before the parties may resort to self-help.  Self-help may conceivably happen as soon as 30 days after the impasse, if neither side takes any further actions towards reaching an agreement, and the President doesn't intervene.

The President may buy some time and prolong the cooling off period by convening a Presidential Emergency Board. Presidential Emergency Boards are a three-person panel appointed by the President of the United States.  The first PEB convened considers proposals and evidence from both sides in a dispute, and publishes a report with their recommendations, including an overall picture of what they think is a fair deal.  While members of PEB's are supposed to be neutral, they are directly appointed by the President, so some say there can be some leanings one way or the other depending on who's holding the office at that time.  Presidential Emergency Boards are supposed to report their findings within 30 days, but that doesn't always happen in complex cases (it definitely isn't an indeterminate process).

After the Presidential Emergency Board publishes its findings, there is another mandatory 30-day cooling off period, during which the two sides may continue to negotiate, but neither side can seek self-help.  If towards the tail end of that cooling-off period nothing improves, the President may convene a second Presidential Emergency Board.  While the structure is similar (the president appoints three neutral members), the format is a bit different.  Instead of considering proposals and evidence from both sides and coming up with what they decide is a fair deal, the second PEB merely considers the "best and final" offer from both sides, and picks A or B: which one they think is the most reasonable.  In the 2014 LIRR contract dispute, the second PEB sided with the unions.

The second Presidential Emergency Board is the last step of the process.  After a second PEB issues their report, there is one last mandatory 30-day cooling off period, after which the parties may seek self-help at 12:01a on the 31st day (unless an agreement is reached or Congress by resolution imposes conditions of its own).

Physical and temporal separation

The short version:

Federal regulations do not allow light rail or subway trains to share the same tracks as mainline freight or passenger trains, however they can operate over the same rights of way provided there is separation between the mainline and non-compliant transit trains:

• Physical separation involves maintaining a minimum safety distance (or constructing a safety wall to lessen that distance) between tracks running transit trains and tracks used for mainline passenger or freight rail.
• Temporal separation enables transit and mainline trains to use the same tracks, but at distinct times so they are never operating on the same tracks at the same time.

The United States has more or less adopted a universal standard gauge (4 ft, 8.5 in) meaning that trains of many different types can use the same tracks.  In the NY area all three railroads, Amtrak, the NYC Subway, and NJTransit light rail lines all use the same standard gauge.  But while it might be technically possible for a NYC Subway car to run on LIRR tracks (or other combinations), FRA regulations place restrictions on what types of trains can use the same tracks.

The LIRR is a federally-regulated, mainline railroad and can therefore connect to and operate over any portion of the national rail network, and trains from other areas of the national rail network (be they other passenger trains or freight) can operate onto the LIRR's tracks.  In order to do this, the LIRR has to comply with a litany of FRA regulations, including those for track maintenance and passenger car safety standards.

Systems not interested in integrating with the national rail network (like subways or many light rail transit lines) can isolate themselves and get relief from many of these regulations (particularly those related to passenger car safety standards).  PATH operates under a system of waivers like this.  In some cases, they can avoid FRA regulation entirely, and fall under the jurisdiction of other regulatory agencies, like the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), which still has standards, but they are not as stringent.

Mixing of mainline rail traffic and trains designed to lesser standards (e.g. subway cars and most light rail trains) is a big no-go in the FRA's eyes, as there is an unacceptable safety risk to passengers in the subway or light rail trains should they be involved in a collision with a freight or other mainline passenger train.

That requirement doesn't always stymie those who would like to see underused freight lines or long unused appendages of former passenger networks better utilized as light rail lines or extensions of nearby subway systems.  But since many of these freight operators still operate over these lines (or may want to in the future), they do not want to fully hand over their trackage rights to a light rail or city transportation system.  The FRA does allow other forms of transit to share mainline tracks, but it requires either physical separation or temporal separation to keep these vehicles entirely separate from mainline passenger or freight trains.

A River LINE train in Burlington, NJ (Photo: Rashaad Jorden)

A recent example of how this was used successfully in this area was the NJTransit River LINE light rail project from Trenton to Camden in southern New Jersey.  Conrail's Bordentown Secondary was purchased by NJTransit, and along with two stretches of new track at either end of the line, was converted into the River LINE system, which entered service in 2004.  NJTransit operates the line as a light rail service using diesel multiple unit cars, not a traditional mainline rail line.  As part of the arrangement to start the new service, NJTransit agreed to employ temporal separation, with light rail trains operating from 5:30a to 10:10p daily (plus all Saturday night and Sunday morning), with Conrail utilizing the rest of the time to provide freight service.  Each system having their own timeslots ensures that light rail trains and freight can both use the same tracks, just a different times, so they never mix.

Physical separation

Physical separation allows mainline and other types of trains to operate using the same rights of way and at the same times, but using different tracks with a minimum safety distance between the two tracks.  If that minimum safety distance can't be provided (because, for example, the tracks are right next to each other), then a barrier can be installed to lessen the spacing requirement.  The spacing/barrier between the two tracks is meant to prevent one train from derailing and colliding onto a train on another track.

This type of separation is not often used, since the amount of space it requires on a right-of-way is significant.  You need at least two tracks, which is not at all typical on narrow, underused freight lines ripe for these types of conversions.  Even employing a three-foot wide safety wall typically requires increasing track centers from 12-15 feet to roughly 20 feet.  This would often involve expanding the right of way, and taking adjacent properties, which put this option well beyond possibility in many cases.

Temporal separation

Temporal separation is much more common, and is what the River LINE example above uses to operate over freight rail tracks during the day.  The FRA defines temporal separation as meaning "passenger and freight operations do not operate on any segment of shared track during the same period and as further defined under [49 CFR § 236.1019] and the process or processes in place to assure that result."

The most common application in these cases is to operate the passenger transit service during the day, while suspending service during the overnight period to allow freight or other mainline trains to operate over the tracks.  The FRA requires there to be a clear dividing point between one and the other, so there's not really a way to alternate non-compliant transit services and mainline trains over the course of the day.

While this is an easy way to utilize underused rail rights of way for transit, it can be met with resistance from freight operators who might not like the idea of being shoehorned into a very limited, overnight operating window to provide their service, but there is a way to work things out, and it often produces better results (i.e. a cheaper project), than building an entirely new right of way for the new transit service.

LIRR Signal Indications

Updated March 2023: updated to add in signals added as part of East Side Acccess.

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The following is an overview of the various signaling aspects currently used on the LIRR:

Speed definitions

The maximum speed a train can operate at is defined a number of different ways.  Maximum authorized speeds (MAS) are defined in the LIRR's Special Instructions for various parts of the system, depending on track geometry, maintenance standards, and other factors.  These speeds can be reduced by permanent speed restrictions (e.g. for a curve), which are also defined in the LIRR's Special Instructions, or temporary speed restrictions (for trackwork), which can be communicated to train crews through general notices or other train orders.  The LIRR Today's speed limit map shows maximum authorized speeds and permanent speed restrictions.

Speeds can also be reduced either through the LIRR's Automated Speed Control system (which conveys speed limits directly to the engineperson in the cab) or through one of the many wayside signal indications shown below.  Unless otherwise noted, "normal", "limited', "medium", "slow", and "restricting" are defined as they pertain to the LIRR as follows:

• Normal speed: maximum authorized speed
• Limited speed: 40 mi/hr (45 mi/hr in Amtrak territory)
• Medium speed: generally 30 mi/hr, but can be up to 40 mi/hr in ASC territory if shown on the cab signal indicator
• Reduced speed: a speed at which a train can be stopped short of another train or obstruction (not conveyed by any signal indications)
• Slow speed: generally 15 mi/hr, but can be up to 30 mi/hr in ASC territory if shown on the cab signal indicator
• Restricted speed: 15 mi/hr or a speed that allows the train to stop within half the sight distance, whichever is less

In all cases, the maximum speed a train can operate it at is the slowest of the MAS, any permanent or temporary speed restrictions, the wayside signal indication, or the cab signal indication, except when wayside signals convey medium or slow speeds, where cab signals can permit a train to travel up to 40 mi/hr or 30 mi/hr, respectively .

Wayside signal indications

Wayside signals are what you commonly think of when you hear of signals...they are physical signals located along the side of (or above) the right-of-way and visually convey to the train crew how they should proceed.

While traffic light design is fairly standardized across the country (and, to some extent, across the world), there is significantly more variety in railroad signaling.  The most common type of signal seen on the LIRR is the position light signal, a style used heavily by the Pennsylvania Railroad, the LIRR's former parent, however the railroad has strayed from the traditional position light signals and have begun installing other signal types, including tri-color and G-head signals in recent years.

The position light signal was developed by the Pennsylvania Railroad in the 1910's as the railroad began electrifying with overhead wire, which made the existing semaphore signals difficult to see.  They first came to the LIRR's Rockaway Beach Branch in May 1929 and later spread across most of the system.  As part of recent signalization or interlocking renewal projects, the LIRR has departed from the traditional position lights and have installed tri-color signals in a number of locations on the South Shore (most recently as part of the Speonk to Montauk Signalization project).  The LIRR has deviated further and has been installing G-head color signals west of Woodside as part of East Side Access.  The LIRR has also replaced certain signals in high-traffic areas that have been frequently violated (like around Jamaica) in the past with more visible color dwarf signals.

Nobody said that the LIRR has to stick with position light signals forever, but if they are going to move to a new typical signal type, one would think they should pick one new standard and run with it.  But instead the railroad is going off in all sorts of different directions...installing tri-color signals in some places, G-head signals for ESA, and reduced aspect signals in others (see below).

The signal indications the LIRR uses are unique to the LIRR, from their own book of rules (though they do bear some resemblance to other standards).  The figures below show some of the most common signal indications used on the LIRR and what they translate to in the LIRR signal variety de jour, as well as Amtrak's color position light signals used elsewhere on the NEC (including portions of NY-Penn Station).  This is not an exhaustive list of indications, just the most common ones you might see.  Also note that not all signals are used to display all of these aspects...in certain cases, if a signal will never display certain aspects, some lamps or even whole heads may be omitted.

In addition, the following indications are introduced in "Zone A" territory, i.e. Amtrak territory around NY-Penn Station.  They are meant to introduce an intermediate stage between medium speed and normal speed (with limited speed indications).  They are approach limited, limited clear, and advance approach.  There is also medium approach, which is similar to the approach indication shown above, with the only difference being the train crew needs to reduce to medium speed as soon as the signal is in sight, not once the train has passed the signal.

In addition, the LIRR also employs some absolute signals. Many of the indications above can be presented as absolute indications by flashing the aspects. These are rarely seen on the LIRR, usually only when the ASC system has failed, and they mean the train can follow the indication shown, but need to approach the next signal prepared to stop.

There are also some additional "signals" covered in the operating rules that are mainly permanent signs or markers, or limited use signals that are only found in yards or near switches in manual block or other non-ASC territory.

There are also a handful of other fixed signs that are used in various locations, as indicated below:

Reduced aspect signaling

The LIRR is beginning to employ reduced aspect signaling, where train movement is largely driven by cab signals and wayside signals are limited to "go", "no go" signals at interlockings.  This type of signaling has been used universally on Metro-North and to some extent on SEPTA and other railroads.  While non-interlocking wayside signals have been removed in most areas on the system (rule 592), the LIRR had previously been using full signals.  The LIRR's first reduced signal aspects have been installed as part of the Ronkonkoma Branch Double Track project.

The reduced aspect signals are covered in rule 298.  Most of these correspond to one or more traditional signal aspects, indicated in the bottom-left corner of the figures above.

Instead of mirroring already established reduced aspect signaling indications, the LIRR created their own system, in part to have aspects that are unique from ones already used in their own signal system and the NORAC aspects that Amtrak uses in and around NY-Penn Station.  Because of this, instead of three simple indications (proceed/cab speed, restricting/absolute proceed, and stop) the LIRR has created six, including two unique aspects: slow proceed and restricting proceed (to differentiate trains that can proceed at slow speed and restricting speed).  The LIRR also relies heavily on the lunar white aspect, and places the red aspect at the top of the signal instead of at the bottom, as is traditional in most other railroad signals.

Some special notes about these aspects:

• Rule 298B (absolute proceed) is displayed for trains when there is an ASC failure or when entering cab signal territory in lieu of absolute clear, absolute medium clear, and absolute slow clear (see absolute signal section above).
• Rule 298D (restricting proceed) is displayed for trains operating into cab signal territory.
• Rule 298E (restricting) is displayed for trains operating onto a siding or into a yard, and when there is an ASC failure in lieu of absolute proceed.

This page shows signal aspects and indications as they were at the time this was published, however changes are bound to happen over time. Have a correction, an update, or see something new? Please send an e-mail to get this updated.

Signal System Varieties

The LIRR employs a number of different signaling system types across the system.  These types of signaling systems (which are rooted and defined in the LIRR's operating rules) govern train movements in different ways.  The table below shows which variety of signal system is used on the respective part of the system.  Note that this is different from LIRR's wayside signal indications, which are the instruments by which train movements governed by the below rules are communicated to train crews.  While the LIRR also has a number of different varieties of wayside signal types, at the end of the day they all communicate a consistent message, and shouldn't be confused with the signal system varieties defined in the rules below.

Each of the segments of track below has two properties in the right columns.  The first indicates whether there is speed control in use along that segment, the second indicates the type of signals used to convey indications to train crews (either wayside for physical signals along the right of way, cab signals, or manual block in the event of no physical or cab signals).  Note that in several cases, different systems are in place depending on the track or direction.  In these cases, normal direction refers to the direction of movement established for a particular track (e.g. eastbound, westbound).  Reverse is the opposite way. Generally, LIRR trains operate on the right-hand side.

Note that the conventions below generally apply to sections of mainline track only, outside of interlocking limits.  Within interlocking limits, different rules may apply (generally, all movements are controlled by wayside signals, except at Y and LOCUST).

Updated March 2021

Branch	from...	...to	Tracks	Direction	Speed control	Train spacing
Amtrak	JO/C	HAR	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Atlantic	BR1	ENI	All	Normal	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Atlantic	BR1	ENI	All	Reverse	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Atlantic	ENI	DUN	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Atlantic	DUN	JAY	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Atlantic	HAL	VAL	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Central	BTH	BAB	All	Both	ACSES II only	Wayside (ABS)
Far Rockaway	VAL	FRY	All	Normal	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Far Rockaway	VAL	FRY	All	Reverse	ACSES II only	Manual Block (CMB)
Hempstead	QNS	GDN	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Hempstead	GDN	HEM	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Long Beach	VAL	LED	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Main Line	HAR	JAY	1, 2	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Main Line	HAR	JAY	3, 4	Normal	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Main Line	HAR	JAY	3, 4	Reverse	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Main Line	JAY	HAL	0-9	Both	ASC only	Wayside (409)
Main Line	HAL	PND	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Main Line	PND	KO	All	East	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Main Line	PND	KO	All	West	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Main Line	KO	GPT	All	Both	ACSES Lite	Manual Block (MBS)
Montauk	HAL	BAB	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Montauk	BAB	Y	All	Normal	ACSES II only	Wayside (ABS)
Montauk	BAB	Y	All	Reverse	ACSES II only	Manual Block (MBS)
Montauk	Y	PD	All	Both	ACSES II only	Manual Block (CMB)
Montauk	PD	MTK	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Oyster Bay	NAS	LOC	All	Normal	ACSES II only	Wayside (ABS)
Oyster Bay	NAS	LOC	All	Reverse	ACSES II only	Manual Block (MBS)
Oyster Bay	LOC	OBY	All	Both	ACSES II only	Manual Block (CMB)
Port Jefferson	DIV	HUN	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Port Jefferson	HUN	JEF	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Port Washington	HAR	WOD	All	Normal	ASC + ACSES II	Wayside (409)
Port Washington	HAR	WOD	All	Reverse	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
Port Washington	WOD	PWS	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)
West Hempstead	VAL	WHD	All	Both	ASC + ACSES II	Cab signals (410)

Speed control:

• ASC (rules 400-408 and 411-412): Automatic Speed Control in place to regulate train speeds
• ACSES II: LIRR's implementation of Positive Train Control
• ACSES Lite: a reduced functionality version of Positive Train Control installed on the North Fork ("ACSES Lite" is not a technical term, but used to refer to the LIRR's application of ACSES II in conjunction with procedural changes in Manual Block territory).

Signal types types:

• Wayside (rule 409): train spacing regulated by wayside signals
• Wayside (ABS): Automatic Block Signaling, train spacing regulated by wayside signals
• Cab signals (rule 410): train spacing regulated by cab signals
• Manual Block (CMB): Controlled Manual Block, used only where there are no locations where trains can pass each other between the starting and ending point, permission to enter block given by setting the signals at the beginning of each segment
• Manual Block (MBS): Manual Block Signaling, train spacing regulated by fixed block signals that may only be passed with written permission

Generally, all of the LIRR's freight-only lines (the Bay Ridge Branch, Bushwick Branch, C Secondary, etc.) are unsignaled, as well as most freight sidings and spurs (like NYAR's Calverton Spurs).  Most of the freight-only territory is dispatched by New York & Atlantic Railway and governed by their own book of rules (similar to the GOCR standard).  The Lower Montauk Branch from JAY to BLISS was previously governed by wayside signals in the normal direction and MBS in the reverse prior to the discontinuation of passenger service in 2012.  Since then, LIRR has downgraded the line to secondary track, and retired the wayside signaling system.  It is now operated and dispatched by NY&AR under their operating rules.

This list was correct at the time of publication, however changes may happen has the railroad continues to upgrade its signal system, especially with the installation of Positive Train Control, which will be installed in most locations that see passenger service, except those noted here.