LIRR issues RFEI for extra railcars to reinforce diesel fleet

The LIRR has issued a Request for Expressions of Interest (RFEI) seeking information from the industry about options for leasing passenger railcars.  The LIRR says that they are contemplating supplementing their diesel fleet with up to 26 passenger coaches from another railroad under a lease agreement.  An RFEI is among the very first steps of the process, meant to gauge potential interest from across the industry before preparing and issuing a formal request for proposals (and this feedback can be used to properly draft the RFP in a way that will likely get a response).  The RFEI was released on January 22 and responses are due back this afternoon (February 23).

This is not the first time LIRR has gone down this road.  The railroad issued a similar request back in October 2013 looking for as many as 7 complete trainsets (including sets of 2-4 passenger cars and 2 locomotives each).  LIRR did not get the answer they were looking for.  

MARC cars in operation on LIRR train 613 at
Kings Park in 2017 (Photo: LIRR)

But several years later, the LIRR was able to reach a lease agreement with MARC in Maryland to lease single-level passenger coaches starting in 2017 (but no locomotives).  The LIRR operated 8 Sumitomo MARC II single-level railcars ​for the summer of 2017 (which were used on a pair of Port Jefferson trains during the "summer of hell").  These cars had been bouncing around—they were leased by SEPTA the prior year when a large portion of their Silverliner V fleet was taken out of service, and the same cars would also be leased by NJT in 2018 when a large number of their cars were pulled from service to install PTC equipment. 

The original agreement (staff summary) was for a one-year lease with two additional one-year options (for a total of 3 years, 2017-2019).  The lease also included provisions for lease of up to 21 cars after the LIRR could complete modifications to allow MARC cab cars to lead trains pushed by LIRR locomotives (testing with C-3 cab cars did take place in the fall of 2017 and appeared successful).  But the LIRR either dropped the ball on exercising the options or failed to enforce its contract and the cars never returned for 2018 or ever since...

The LIRR has longstanding issues with its diesel fleet and has been struggling with capacity for more than a decade.  When the LIRR ordered the current C-3 diesel fleet, they ordered far fewer cars than the old fleet they were replacing, and cut seating capacity by 15% over the older fleet.  This not only greatly reduced capacity on the diesel branches, but has left the railroad zero room for growth on the diesel branches as population grows and travel patterns change in diesel territory.  The LIRR has used the lack of diesel equipment as an excuse as to why they can't improve service in diesel territory for the last 15 years.  The LIRR's new service plan for East Side Access brought virtually no improvements to service on the diesel branches, the railroad claims because they don't have enough equipment...

In addition to the longstanding capacity crunch during normal operations, the diesel fleet is pushed to its limits during the summer with extreme crowding, short trains, and delays common on summer weekends as riders overwhelm Montauk Branch trains.

The most obvious use case for additional cars is to supplement the diesel fleet during the summer months when it is stretched to the limit.  In 2017, the LIRR used 6 of the 8 cars on Port Jefferson trains 613 and 664 which made a single round-trip from Port Jefferson to Hunterspoint Avenue and back and reassigned the regular cars on those trains to other branches.  The rise of work from home and changing travel patterns on the South Fork means that there is not the extreme volume of people heading east on Fridays and back west on Sundays, plus the LIRR's summer service was so bad for so long that many riders are fed up and have been finding other ways to get where they want to go (with seasonal ridership to/from the Hamptons steadily declining since 2013).  But there's still plenty of room for reinforcements, especially if the railroad wants to mount more than the usual summer service offering with its regular shortcomings.

But more diesel cars could also provide relief for riders during peak hours year-round.  The LIRR is also now greatly struggling with capacity on its electric fleet since the start of East Side Access.  The railroad has failed to complete the M-9/M-9A order in a timely manner, and is significantly short of EMU cars compared to what it expected to have for ESA opening day.  As a result, the LIRR has been scrambling to match capacity to demand (frequently failing to do so), and has most recently resorted to cutting rush hour trains to reallocate cars to other trains.  

With additional diesel cars, the railroad could boost capacity during rush hours by building up the 5 dual mode sets that operate into/out of NY-Penn Station.  Running the Port Jefferson and Speonk dual modes with 10 or 12 cars could offer additional capacity for these trains to make stops in electric territory (e.g. Port Jefferson dual modes could add stops at Cold Spring Harbor, Syosset, Hicksville, and Mineola; the Speonk dual modes can add stops at Amityville, Massapequa Park, Massapequa, and Seaford).  This would take stress off of electric trains during busy times, perhaps allowing for cars or entire electric sets to be shuffled around to other trains.  The leased cars could backfill capacity on other diesel trains that operate to/from Hunterspoint Avenue. It would be a far faster solution than waiting around for the M-9A order to get figured out.

After LIRR failed to get the MARC cars back in 2018, the railroad issued a new RFEI starting the process over again.  I was admonished by the MTA at the time for characterizing it as a pointless exercise, but ultimately the railroad's effort proved to be fruitless...  Because of the LIRR's difficult clearance requirements, with car heights limited by tunnels and low overpasses, and the carbody shape limited by third rail, platforms and canopies, and other obstructions there are simply very few compatible cars that meet the LIRR's clearance requirements.  Pretty much any railroad outside the northeast have much more generous loading gauges, and most operate bi-level cars that are several feet taller than LIRR's equipment.  With so few options out there, the second-hand market has been almost non-existent.

But there may be some better prospects this time around.  With commuter rail ridership across the country remaining significantly lower following the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the LIRR's peer systems are operating well below pre-pandemic capacity, and several are still operating reduced schedules.  Some of these railroads may now be able to part with some equipment (if a railroad is operating at 70% of pre-pandemic ridership, they could conceivably lease out up to 30% of their coach fleet and still have enough room for everyone).  This would not only bring short-term relief for LIRR riders, and bring in revenue for struggling commuter systems.  

There are likely more options out there, but the railroad still has an uphill battle.  Some potential options include:

• MBTA MBB BTC-3/Bombardier BTC-1 coaches: The MBTA has a number of single-level cars.  16 of these cars were used by CTrail on the Hartford Line, but have recently been returned with the start of M-8 electric service on Shore Line East.  However, the MBTA's commuter rail operation is one of the few US commuter railroads to see a robust ridership recovery, with Commuter Rail ridership rebounding to nearly 95% of pre-pandemic levels last fall. MBTA is also planning on expanding its network and completing the first phase of the South Coast Rail Project at some point this year.  The MBTA's Kawasaki bi-level cars are too tall to fit the LIRR's clearance requirements. 
• SEPTA Comet I/II coaches: SEPTA has 45 unpowered Comet coaches (same as the equipment used by NJT, Metro-North, and CTrail) that are used for push-pull trains.  These cars are mainly used only during peak hours on express trains (while SEPTA principally uses their EMU fleet for other trains).  SEPTA is in the process of replacing these cars with new CRRC cars, but these have been delayed.  Perhaps they could part with some of them earlier than that.
• VRE/CTrail Mafersa coaches: There are 33 coaches that were originally built by Brazillian manufacturer Mafersa for Virginia Railway Express and sold to the Connecticut Department of Transportation in 2004.  Some of these cars were rebuilt and used on CTrail's Shore Line East service for many years until electric service with M-8 cars started on SLE in 2022, and then the cars were shifted over to the Hartford Line.  However, there are still other cars that are in storage and not used for Hartford Line service.  While these single-level cars fit inside the tunnels, these cars reportedly have clearance issues with third rail (and never operated into Metro-North's third rail territory or GCT when they were used on Shore Line East).  These cars also have manual doors, which make their use on busy rush hour trains impractical.  
• NJT Comet II/IV/V and MLV I/II coaches: all of NJT's push-pull coaches could conceivably work with the LIRR's clearance requirements, as they operate in the same East River Tunnels the LIRR uses between Manhattan and Sunnyside Yard in Queens.  While NJT has restored most rail lines to pre-pandemic service levels, they are not carrying as many riders as pre-pandemic and could conceivably loan out some cars.
• Exo (formerly AMT) MLV I coaches: Exo in Montreal operates 160 Bombardier MLV coaches (built to the same specifications as NJT's cars).  Exo also recently retired some older cars that do not meet the LIRR's specifications (that could theoretically be brought back to loan out cars to LIRR).  But the international nature of this transaction makes it unlikely.
• Metro-North Shoreliner I/II/III/IV and Comet II/V coaches: Who better to look for in a time of need than your sibling system?  Metro-North has a deep coach pool with single-level cars used in both its East and West of Hudson diesel services.  With Metro-North only operating at about 75% of pre-pandemic ridership over the last few months, they would be the best candidate to loan coaches (especially during the summer months when more riders are on vacation).  And they would be easy to transfer between the two systems.  But the optics of the MTA taking cars and seats from Metro-North riders to give to LIRR would look bad, so that may preclude the application of common sense.
• MARC Sumitomo MARC II and Bombardier MARC IV (MLV): The single-level MARC II cars that were being loaned out in the late 2010's are reportedly still in operable condition and would likely be the best candidates for any future lease arrangement (especially since the LIRR is already familiar with them from their visit in 2017).  MARC also has Bombardier MLV cars that are built to similar specifications as NJTransit and Exo and can likely meet LIRR's needs.

The LIRR's diesel fleet is definitely in dire need of reinforcements, and hopefully the railroad is more aggressive in its pursuit of potentail lease options this time around.  While leasing cars are a reasonable short-term fix to a very present and acute problem, it is not a substitute for a real, concrete path forward towards replacement of the current diesel fleet...and as the LIRR continues to struggle to meet its rolling stock needs, there is little sign of hope on the horizon.

LIRR signalperson pleads guilty to charges stemming from 2019 derailment

LIRR signalperson Stuart Conklin has pled guilty to federal charges of falsifying a federal inspection report from an inspection of a rail bond that subsequently failed and caused the collision of two trains east of Speonk on Memorial Day weekend in 2019.  Mr. Conklin falsely submitted an inspection report saying that he visually inspected the rail bond, however CCTV camera footage showed Mr. Conklin was not present at the rail joint on the day he said he made the inspection.  He was not charged with causing the derailment, the significant damage to the track and both trains, or the ensuing weekend of service disruptions and chaos—but had Mr. Conklin done his job properly, he very likely would have discovered the defect that ultimately led to the incident.  He will be sentenced on May 17, and faces up to two years in Federal prison.

(Photo: MTA)

In the early hours of Saturday morning over Memorial Day Weekend in 2019, train 8700 (the 1:09a train from Jamaica to Montauk) carrying 32 passengers collided with a non-passenger equipment train 5785 (the equipment of the Cannonball train, returning empty from Montauk back to Jamaica), causing both trains to derail.  No injuries were reported, but the incident destroyed hundreds of feet of track, caused significant damage to both trains, and resulted in significant service impacts for nearly 48 hours over the course of a busy holiday weekend.

Train 5785 was the return equipment of the Cannonball from the prior night, the railroad's longest scheduled passenger train at 14 units long (2 locomotives and 12 C-3 cars).  It was waiting on the SK Freight Track siding just east of Speonk station for train 8700 to pass—but given that the siding is only 13 cars long, the rear locomotive fouled the siding's east switch.  A report issued by the Federal Railroad Administration following the derailment pointed towards a loss of shunt on a track circuit as the primary cause of the incident.  This falsely gave train 8700 a clear signal, and as it accelerated out of Speonk station, it collided with the east locomotive dangling off the end of the siding, causing portions of both trains to derail.

Mr. Conklin was separately suspected of fraudulently claiming regular and overtime pay for hours not worked, and was reportedly under investigation for this around the same time.  In the indictment filed in 2021, investigators stated that location data from Mr. Conklin's phone, along with other evidence, allegedly showed multiple occasions where he was absent from his workplace during times he claimed to be working (including shifts being paid overtime).  E-mails obtained by the US DOT's Office of the Inspector General show the LIRR reinspected certain pieces of equipment that were supposed to have been inspected by Mr. Conklin and found additional locations where rail bonds were either broken or in poor condition—additional points that could have failed and caused a similar or more significant incident—yet were not reported on inspection reports completed by Mr. Conklin or escalated for repair. A source told the New York Post in 2019 that Mr. Conklin "'basically made his own hours,'" and that "his no-work approach was an open secret among his colleagues".  According to payroll records, Mr. Conklin made $61,101 in overtime during 2018 on top of his $95,668 base pay—increasing his earnings by 65%.

Mr. Conklin submitted a handwritten letter of resignation to the LIRR on May 31, 2019—6 days after the collision—after being confronted about the two probes.  

US Attorney Breon Peace said in a statement “As dramatically evidenced by the derailment, the rail bond Conklin falsely claimed to have inspected was a critical piece of rail road equipment, essential to ensuring the safety of passengers."

In a statement to Newsday, Anthony LaPinta, an attorney for Mr. Conklin tried to argue that he was being scapegoated for another LIRR employee's error.  “Mr. Conklin conducted a track inspection and submitted a report with the wrong date. The derailment occurred because an LIRR track operator mistakenly directed an oversized, empty train to the wrong track. The LIRR’s efforts to use Mr. Conklin as the scapegoat for the derailment is very troubling.”

While the rail bond defect that Mr. Conklin failed to identify was cited as one of the key factors in the incident, there were multiple points of failure where the LIRR could have helped prevent the sideswipe from ever happening in the first place, but didn't.  There were several major operational blunders by the train crews and dispatchers working that day were a significant lapse of proper safety practices. 

Westbound equipment train 5785 departed Montauk 9 minutes late that night due to a door issue in one of the C-3 cars in the consist.  Because of the delay, the block operator and dispatcher on duty that night decided to move the meet from Mastic-Shirley—where the siding is long enough to accommodate the 14-car Cannonball equipment—to Speonk, where the siding was too short.  While the crew of train 5785, the Babylon East block operator, and the Section C dispatcher were all aware of the risk that the rear of train 5785 might be fouling the switch, the Babylon East block operator did not review these risks with the crew of train 8700.

When train 5785 stopped on the siding and the signal system erroneously reported the switch was clear, both the Babylon East block operator and the Section C dispatcher made the huge mistake of blindly trusting the signal system.  Despite nine LIRR employees being directly party to the incident (four crew members on train 8700, three crew members on train 5785, the Babylon East block operator, and the Section C dispatcher), nobody thought to stop and take 30 seconds to visually verify that the rear locomotive was in fact clear of the switch.  Instead, everyone blindly trusted the signal system and just assumed that the special instructions had been wrong for decades.  

100% of the factors contributing to the incident wholly within the LIRR's control at practically every step of the way—from the malfunctioning door to the lax inspection protocols to the risky decisions taken by the employees involved.  This incident was completely avoidable.  Luckily, nobody was hurt in this case, but not every train runs at 3:00a on a Saturday morning in one of the most underused portions of the system.   This incident could have been prevented had any one of nearly a dozen LIRR employees done their jobs properly, or exercised just a little bit more care:

1. Stuart Conklin, for failing to properly inspect the rail bond that was defective.
2. the Babylon East block operator, who blindly believed the signal system was correct when train 5785 was showing clear of the switch, and for failing to warn the crew of train 8700 of the risky "saw-by" maneuver, assuming that the signals would properly direct the train.
3. the Section C dispatcher, for assuming that the siding length listed in the timetable was wrong all along and failing to intervene to stop the maneuver when the timetable said the siding was too short.
4. Conklin's supervisor, for failing to ensure his or her report was properly doing his job.
5. the conductor on train 5785 for failing to recognize that they were operating a 14-unit train parked on a 13-car siding and failing to verify that the train had properly cleared the switch (the three train crew members on 5785 are all jointly and severally responsible).
6. the assistant conductor on train 5785, who is customarily supposed to be positioned at the rear of the train and should have visually verified that the train had properly cleared the switch.
7. the engineer on train 5785.
8. the signal maintainer performing the other portion of the test that Mr. Conklin failed to witness, for not confirming in real time that the visual portion of the test was being properly completed. 
9. the conductor on train 8700 for blindly trusting the signal system and failing to exercise caution, accelerating to full speed even though the meet with train 5785 was moved from its scheduled location, the Cannonball operating with 14-units is widely known, and failing to recognize that the siding at Speonk is only 13-cars long and likely too short for the opposing train.
10. the engineer on train 8700.
11. the assistant conductor on train 8700.
12. the collector on train 8700.

Mr. Conklin does not get to pass the buck, but despite all of the tremendous safety benefits railroaders allege come with multiple person train crews—train 5785 had three crew members onboard, train 8700 had four crew members onboard, while trains in most other parts of the world have only one operator—none of the seven train crew members directly party to the incident elected to stop and think that maybe the signal system wasn't wrong all along.  

MTA and LIRR officials have said little publicly to assure riders that they have taken steps to address these problems and reprioritize passenger safety since this 2019 incident.  The nexus between the LIRR's overtime scandal and incident are certainly something to behold.  LIRR employees slacking off or filling out false timecards not only hurt our wallets, but also can have significant safety implications that could disrupt service, or even worse.  LIRR must demonstrate to riders that they are reigning in these types of abuse and reestablishing their safety culture to prevent an incident like this from happening again.

LIRR will restore 15 weekday trains from January 3

The LIRR posted new timetables dated January 3, 2022 to its website that reflect a slight increase in service coming for the new year.  The new timetables add 15 trains back to the weekday schedules and make adjustments to several others.  A summary list is included below, but be sure to check the timetables to see if there have been any adjustments to your trains (or any connections).

The LIRR continues to run reduced weekday service as the region recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic.  These changes will bring the total number of weekday trains up to about 656, which is 96 fewer trains than the pre-pandemic schedules (or a 13% reduction in service).  The cuts continue to be much deeper during the rush hours—the LIRR will now operate about 115 AM peak trains (which is 21% fewer than pre-pandemic) and about 104 PM peak trains (about 23% fewer than pre-pandemic).  The MTA has said that they will restore peak fares—which charge riders up to 62% more per trip—beginning on March 1.

Aside from the LIRR's horribly botched attempt at running weekend schedules for weekday schedules last March, this represents the largest restoration of trains since the railroad cut service to its current levels in late January of this year (prior to this, the railroad had added back just 4 trains in 2021, despite ridership more than doubling since January).  Overall, the LIRR is still running fewer trains than they did last fall when the region was first reopening.

Crowding conditions on train 868, which won't see
relief with the new timetable (Photo: @emmydoos87/Twitter)

The additional runs are largely restorations of pre-pandemic trains on their same old schedules.  The LIRR is continuing to just tinker with the pre-pandemic timetables (which have gone largely unchanged since the railroad moved to zone scheduling in the early 1970's) and is not making much of an effort to better distribute or even out service to fill gaps.  These restored trains will help to address some of the more egregious gaps in service that these sloppy cuts have dealt riders, as well as some of the more common complaints of overcrowding.  Though make no mistake, there are still several gaps in rush hour service of nearly an hour or more at a number of stations across the system, and there are still many trains that see an outsized number of riders due to sloppy scheduling.

Train 2742 will be returning to NY-Penn Station to offer
Montauk Branch riders a second one-seat ride this winter
(Photo: The LIRR Today)

There are a small handful of minor improvements over the pre-pandemic schedules that are worth noting (mostly just extensions or added stops to existing trains):

• Train 2150 (formerly train 2350 to Farmingdale) has been restored and will make an added stop at Ronkonkoma.  Before the pandemic, this train (like many other Farmingdale trains since the Double Track project was completed) ran empty from Farmingdale all the way to Ronkonkoma Yard, skipping all stops east of Farmingdale.  This 4:09p train has been restored and will add a stop at Ronkonkoma only—hopefully taking pressure off train 2058 (the 3:55p to Ronkonkoma), which was always a chronically overcrowded train pre-pandemic and is again now.  LIRR did something similar to train 2109 (formerly train 2309) in the morning earlier this year, which now originates at Ronkonkoma instead of running empty from Ronkonkoma all the way to Farmingdale.
• Train 2735 has been restored but is being truncated to Hunterspoint Avenue and will now run empty to Long Island City yard.
• Train 2742 has been restored, and not only will Montauk Branch riders be getting back an evening rush hour train to close an hour and 40 minute gap, but it is also getting back a second dual mode.  Train 2742 was operated as a dual mode from New York beginning in February 2018, but was cut back after less than 18 months as part of a round of service cuts to the diesel branches in September 2019.

Overall, this is definitely a step in the right direction, but the railroad is continuing to ignore the plain fact that commuting patterns have changed pretty dramatically since it last overhauled its service patterns in the early 1970's.  At this point, it seems like they will just continue to play the copy and paste game at least until East Side Access opens at the end of next year.  What will happen with East Side Access continues to be a big mystery—despite the project going on for over a decade and receiving $11 billion in public funds, the MTA has never communicated a firm operating plan.  The major question will be whether LIRR tries to mutilate the existing schedules further by just blanketly shifting Brooklyn trains to NY-Grand Central and doing some minor reshuffling?  Will they just dust off the concept service plan from the 1990's that almost as much out of date?  Or will the LIRR try to try to start from scratch and build a new schedule from the ground up that really meets the needs of today's riders?  This is especially important if the LIRR is going to continue to extend these service cuts into 2023 and not deliver 100% of the service it promised for ESA opening day.

New schedules with more frequent and efficient service are what's really needed—but given how LIRR's Service Planning group so horribly botched the March service reduction fiasco, I'm not at all optimistic the railroad can deliver on this critically important challenge.  The close to $20 billion we've invested in LIRR infrastructure improvements over the last decade is great, but physical assets are only one part of the equation—if the railroad isn't going to operate train service that makes the most of this new capacity, it will be prove to be a poor bang for all of the taxpayers' bucks.

Below is a full list of changes that have been loaded in the January 3 schedules—hopefully this will open up some space on your commute!

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West of Babylon Branch:

• Train 1191, the 5:43a train from Freeport has been restored.  It makes stops at Baldwin and Rockville Centre, then Jamaica and NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 6:24a (this was not an official train pre-pandemic, but it has operated off and on since 2017 as a fluff train during trackwork at NY-Penn Station).
• Train 1001, the 5:59a train from Massapequa Park has been restored.  It makes stops at Massapequa, Seaford, Freeport, Baldwin, Rockville Centre, Jamaica, Kew Gardens, Forest Hills, then NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 6:55a.
• Train 19, the 5:56a train from Babylon has been restored.  It makes stops at Lindenhurst, Copiague, Amityville, Wantagh, Bellmore, Merrick, Jamaica, Woodside, then NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 6:59a.
• Train 142, the 4:16p train from Brooklyn-Atlantic Terminal to Babylon has been restored.  It makes stops at Nostrand Avenue, East New York, Jamaica, Rockville Centre, then local stops to Babylon, arriving there at 5:28p.
• Train 1158, the 6:09p triple-combined train to Freeport, Wantagh, and Babylon departs 1 minute earlier (was 6:10p).  All other stops remain unchanged.
• Train 192, the 10:52p train to Babylon has been restored.  It makes stops at Woodside, Jamaica, Rockville Centre, then all local stops to Babylon, arriving there at 12:09a the next morning.

Montauk Branch:

• Train 2735, the 5:30a train from Speonk to Long Island City has been restored but has been truncated back to Hunterspoint Avenue.  It makes local stops to Bay Shore, then Babylon, Jamaica, and Hunterspoint Avenue only, arriving there at 7:26a (this train now makes stops at Bellport and Babylon, which it skipped in the pre-pandemic schedules—the original schedules also showed it stopping at Babylon, but they have been updated to remove that stop).
• Train 2742, the 7:30p train from Babylon has been restored and extended to NY-Penn Station and will originate there at 6:27p.  This train adds stops at NY-Penn Station, Woodside, and Jamaica, then runs express to Babylon and makes all local stops to Speonk, arriving there at 8:30p.

Ronkonkoma Branch:

• Train 201, the 5:25a train from Greenport to Ronkonkoma returns to its regular schedule after extra schedule padding had been added during the fall months (now departs up to 3 minutes later, arrives at the same time).
• Train 2019, the 6:56a train from Ronkonkoma to Brooklyn-Atlantic Terminal has been restored.  It makes local stops to Wyandanch, then Farmingdale, Bethpage, Hicksville, Mineola, Jamaica, East New York, Nostrand Avenue, and Brooklyn-Atlantic Terminal, arriving there at 8:17a.
• Train 2021, the 7:04a train from Ronkonkoma returns to its pre-pandemic schedule (but will continue to stop at Jamaica).  It departs stations 3-4 minutes later and now skips Central Islip, Brentwood, Hicksville, and Mineola.
• Train 2025, the 7:32a train from Ronkonkoma returns to its regular schedule after extra schedule padding had been added during the fall months (now departs up to 3 minutes later, arrives at the same time).  
• Train 2309, the 7:26a train from Ronkonkoma has been renumbered to train 2109 and returns to its regular schedule after extra schedule padding had been added during the fall months (now departs up to 3 minutes later, arrives at the same time).
• Train 2350, the 4:09p train to Farmingdale has been renumbered as train 2150 and extended to Ronkonkoma.  It makes stops at Woodside, Jamaica, Mineola, Hicksville, Bethpage, Farmingdale, then Ronkonkoma, arriving there at 5:30p.  This train no longer stops at Westbury (but other stopping times are unchanged).

West of Huntington Branch:

• Train 1203, the 6:25a train from Hicksville has been restored.  It makes local stops to New Hyde Park, then Jamaica and NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 7:11a.

Oyster Bay Branch:

• Train 511, the 8:14a train from Oyster Bay to Long Island City has been restored.  It makes local stops to Mineola, then Jamaica, Hunterspoint Avenue, and Long Island City, arriving there at 9:37a.  Note: this train has extra schedule padding added from its pre-pandemic schedule, it departs Oyster Bay 2 minutes earlier and arrives LIC 1 minute later.
• Train 562, the 6:00p train from Jamaica to Oyster Bay has been restored.  It runs express to East Williston, then makes local stops to Oyster Bay, arriving there at 6:58p. 

Port Washington Branch:

• Train 419, the 7:19a train from Port Washington has been restored.  It makes local stops to Great Neck, then Mets-Willets Point, Woodside, and NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 7:58a.
• Train 388, the 6:08p train to Great Neck will be renumbered as train 362 and return to its pre-pandemic schedule, departing NY-Penn Station at 18 minutes earlier at 5:50p.  This train makes stops at Mets-Willets Point, Bayside, then local stops to Great Neck, arriving there at 6:20p.
• Train 355, the 6:44p reverse-peak train from Great Neck has been restored.  It makes stops local stops to Bayside, then Flushing-Main Street, Mets-Willets Point, Woodside, and NY-Penn Station, arriving there at 7:15p.
• Train 456, the 6:11p train to Port Washington will return to its pre-pandemic schedule, depart NY-Penn Station 1 minute earlier at 6:10p, and skip Woodside, Flushing-Main Street, Flushing-Murray Hill, Flushing-Broadway, Flushing-Auburndale, Bayside, Douglaston, and Little Neck.  It arrives stations Great Neck to Port Washington between 8 and 9 minutes earlier.
• Train 366, the 6:14p train to Great Neck has been restored.  This train makes stops at Woodside, Mets-Willets Point, Flushing-Main Street, then local stops to Great Neck, arriving there at 6:51p.

LIRR signalperson indicted in wake of 2019 Speonk derailment

Last week, a criminal complaint was unsealed in federal court charging former LIRR signal maintainer Stuart Conklin with falsifying a federal inspection report.  The case is being brought by the US Attorney's Office for EDNY, with the US DOT's Office of the Inspector General and the MTA Inspector General joining in the investigation.

Photo of crews rerailing the east locomotive of train
8700, which derailed east of Speonk (Photo: MTA LIRR)

This news comes in the wake of the 2019 sideswipe of two trains east of Speonk over Memorial Day Weekend.  In the early hours of that Saturday morning, train 8700 (the 1:09a train from Jamaica to Montauk) carrying 32 passengers collided with a non-passenger equipment train 5785 (running empty from Montauk back to Jamaica), causing both trains to derail.  No injuries were reported, but the incident caused significant service impacts for nearly 48 hours over the course of a busy holiday weekend.

Train 5785 was the return equipment of the Cannonball, the railroad's longest scheduled passenger train at 14 units long (2 locomotives and 12 C-3 cars), and it was waiting on the SK Freight Track siding just east of Speonk station for 8700 to pass—but given that the siding is only 13 cars long, it was too short for the 14 unit train, and so the rear locomotive fouled the siding's east switch.  As train 8700 accelerated out of Speonk station, it collided with the east locomotive dangling off the end of the siding, causing portions of both trains to derail, resulting in two days of service disruptions, tens of thousands of dollars in track damage, and permanently damaging DM locomotive 511, which has been out of service since the incident.

A report issued by the Federal Railroad Administration following the derailments pointed towards a loss of shunt on a track circuit as the primary cause of the incident.  

Summary diagrams illustrating how track circuits detect train presence
(Matt Johnson)

Most rail signal systems rely on electrical currents that pass through the running rails to detect where trains are in an area.  The two running rails represent two ends of a circuit, and normally carry a low voltage current that passes between the two running rails, a power supply, and a relay that communicates with the rest of the signal system.  When a train with its metal wheels passes over a segment of tracks, the wheels short or "shunt" the circuit, resulting in the current passing through the train's wheels and not the relay—which tells the signal system there is a train occupying that block.  It works similarly to how plugging a lamp into an outlet completes an electrical circuit that allows a lightbulb to illuminate.  Because tracks have small brakes at various points, "rail bonds" are used to help bridge the electrical currents used by the signal systems between two adjoining pieces of rail. 

An investigation determined that one of those rail bonds had broken.  As a result of that break, the rear locomotive fouling the east switch and the main track did not "shunt" the track circuit giving the dispatcher, block operator, and crew of train 8700 the indication that the track was clear for the eastbound train to proceed at track speed.    

The track circuit that failed was the same track circuit that Mr. Conklin is alleged to have falsely claimed he inspected a few weeks prior (around April 26, 2019).  On a federal inspection form signed by Mr. Conklin, he is alleged to have recorded that the bonds for the track circuit at this location "passed" inspection.  One required component of this inspection (which has to take place every 90 days per 49 CFR § 234.271) is that a qualified person "visually inspect all rail bonds on all track circuits within the limits of all interlockings" and that to verify the integrity of the bond wires, the person must "apply pressure to bond wires".  

The investigation revealed that despite Mr. Conklin claim on the inspection form that the rail bond had been tested, CCTV video from the day of the purported inspection showed that nobody performed the required physical component of the inspection.  As a result, he allegedly failed to identify the defect in the signal system that eventually resulted in the crash.

Mr. Conklin submitted a handwritten letter of resignation to the LIRR on May 31, 2019—6 days after the collision.

E-mails obtained by the US DOT's Office of the Inspector General show that following the derailment, the LIRR reinspected certain pieces of equipment that were supposed to have been inspected by Mr. Conklin and found additional locations where rail bonds were either broken or in poor condition—additional points that could have failed and caused a similar or more significant incident—yet were not reported on inspection reports completed by Mr. Conklin or escalated for repair.  

Needless to say, the allegations contained in the complaint are extreemly concerning—and beg the question to what extent falsification of federal inspection forms is prevalent across the LIRR's signal and other maintenance of way departments.  The e-mail correspondence indicates this was not an isolated incident—if Mr. Conklin was truly a "lone wolf", why was management not properly overseeing his work to detect these falsified forms prior to passengers being put in danger?  What procedures have since been put in place to prevent this from happening again?  How many of the thousands of other delays caused by "signal trouble" over the last several years (that did not arise to the level of severity to prompt a full investigation, as in this case) could have been avoided if inspection programs were being followed?

Mr. Conklin is charged with falsifying a record required to be maintained under Federal law (49 USC 21311 (a)(1)).  If convicted, he faces a fine, up to 2 years in prison, or both. 

Conklin suspected of being an OT cheat as well

Falsifying inspection reports may end up not being Mr. Conklin's only entanglement with the law—he is reportedly suspected of fraudulently claiming regular and overtime pay for hours not worked as well.  In the complaint, it's mentioned that location data was obtained from Mr. Conklin's phone as part of the investigation.  That cell phone location data, along with other evidence, allegedly showed multiple occasions where he was absent from his workplace during times he claimed to be working (including shifts being paid overtime).  The complaint details several examples where Mr. Conklin was supposed to have been working in various places across the system (including checking for vandalism in places like Speonk and a grade crossing in East Moriches), yet his cell phone records show that he was making and receiving calls in the Ronkonkoma area—where he lived.

Reporting in the New York Post in 2019 indicated that Mr. Conklin may have already been under investigation by the MTA for lying about work hours around the time of the collision.  A source told the Post that Mr. Conklin "'basically made his own hours,'" and that "his no-work approach was an open secret among his colleagues".  According to payroll records, Mr. Conklin made $61,101 in overtime payments during 2018 on top of his $95,668 base pay—increasing his earnings by 65%.

Charges relating to the alleged OT fraud were not included in the indictment unsealed earlier this month, however subsequent or separate charges could be filed at a later date related to these issues.

Last month, four other current or former LIRR track workers pled not guilty to fraud and conspiracy charges alleging they illegally claimed tens of thousands in OT pay, with the indictment alleging the group repeatedly covered for one another when they were not at work, but instead bowling, on vacation, or attending concerts.  At the time of their arrest, Acting US Attorney Audrey Strauss said, “these defendants...allegedly made themselves some of the highest-paid employees at the entire MTA by claiming extraordinary, almost physically impossible, amounts of overtime" and that "those almost impossible claims were fueled by brazen, repeated fraud, including falsely claiming to be working overtime hours while the defendants were at their homes or, in some instances, bowling."  The four LIRR workers named in that case being brought by the US Attorney's Office for SDNY—Joseph Balestra, Thomas Caputo, Joseph Ruzzo, John Nugent—took home an average of $274,051 in overtime pay each in 2018.  

Again, this other indictment suggests that instances where maintenance employees were raking in overtime while critical safety checks were going ignored was not (or is not) an insolated thing.  Following the unsealing of the Balestra indictment, MTA Inspector General Carolyn Pokorny said, “[t]hese employees allegedly worked very hard—to steal MTA time and money, ignoring their duty to keep the tracks and rails safe for their fellow workers and riders."  Ms. Pokorny went on to take aim at deficient management oversight, saying "the situation underscores what our Office has been saying, again and again – the lack of management systems and controls at the MTA creates an environment where fraud could easily occur undetected – and it did, as alleged in these criminal complaints.  When employees are on the clock, management needs to know that they are actually working, and not – say, enjoying concerts in Atlantic City, vacationing at resorts, or competing in a bowling league."

The nexus between the Speonk incident and the MTA's ongoing overtime scandal is certainly something to behold.  It definitely underscores the significance of the issue—OT fraud not only hurts us in our wallets at the fareboxes, but when necessary safety and inspection tasks are not being carried out because someone took a shift for the pay but never showed up to do the work, it can create situations that can result in failures that delay trains or contribute towards life-or-death consequences in cases like the Speonk incident.

Hauling the most egregious offenders into court is certainly a headline-grabbing approach to stir public outcry and get the issue into the papers, but the real issue—as it was with the LIRR's disability scandal—is that there has been and continues to be a culture of fraud at the LIRR that allows this behavior to take place.  That is the real root issue—and obviously something that was not adequately addressed in the wake of the disability scandal, and it's doubtful the MTA and the railroad are taking sufficient action to address it now in their rush to tamp down OT.  While few engage in fraud to this brazen degree, many more are complicit in it when they look the other way.  In Mr. Conklin's case, his "no-work approach" was reportedly "an open secret among his colleagues"—yet none of them stepped up to report this fraud before passengers lives were put at risk when one of the components he was supposed to have inspected failed.  If people look the other way on disability claims, then OT slips, then federal safety inspection forms...what's next? 

Multiple points of failure

While Mr. Conklin is being charged with falsifying the inspection form, he is not being charged with causing the incident itself.  While the faulty rail bond was cited as one of the key factors in the incident, there were multiple points of failure where the LIRR could have helped prevent the sideswipe from ever happening in the first place, but didn't.

The operational blunders by the train crews and dispatchers working that day were also a pretty significant lapse of proper safety practices.  Westbound equipment train 5785 departed Montauk 9 minutes late that night due to a door issue in one of the C-3 cars in the consist.  Because of the delay, the block operator and dispatcher on duty that night decided to move the meet from Mastic-Shirley—where the siding is long enough to accommodate the 14-car Cannonball equipment—to Speonk, where the siding was just a little too short.  While the crew of train 5785, the Babylon East block operator, and the Section C dispatcher were all aware of the risk that the rear of train 5785 might be fouling the switch, the Babylon East block operator did not review these risks with the crew of train 8700.

When train 5785 stopped on the siding and the signal system erroneously reported the switch was clear, both the Babylon East block operator and the section dispatcher made the huge mistake of blindly trusting the signal system.  Despite nine LIRR employees being directly party to the incident (four crew members on train 8700, three crew members on train 5785, the Babylon East block operator, and the Section C dispatcher), nobody thought to stop and take 30 seconds to visually verify that the rear locomotive was in fact clear of the switch.  Instead, everyone blindly trusted the signal system and just assumed that the special instructions had been wrong for decades.  

This incident is a great example of how many minor factors can lead to major incidents—in this case, there was no clear "smoking gun", but rather a series of minor missteps that all compounded and amplified the risk, eventually leading to the incident.  In this case, 100% of the factors were wholly within the LIRR's control at every step of the way—from the malfunctioning door to the lax inspection protocols to the risky decisions taken by the employees involved.  This incident was completely avoidable.  Luckily, nobody was hurt in this case, but not every train runs at 3:00a on a Saturday morning in one of the most underused portions of the system. 

The actions of the Babylon East block operator and the Section C dispatcher were reprehensible, but again the real issue is not really the particular actions of two careless employees in this one situation, but rather a bigger cultural issue where rider safety seemed to have been an afterthought—stopping to re-plan and review risks with all parties involved after deviating from a plan is a pretty standard element of safety programs well beyond the railroad industry.  Yet the timetable was assumed to be wrong as a mere matter of course.  This seems like a pretty obvious area for improvement, yet the employees involved in this incident were reportedly "cleared of any wrongdoing by the Long Island Rail Road" according to comments provided to Newsday by Nicholas Peluso, a representative of the TCU (which represents block operators and dispatchers).

While it can be easy to get caught up in the tantalizing headlines about cases of employees taking their egregious actions a few steps too far, it's important to be cognizant of the bigger picture root causes, and making sure those are adequately addressed.  So far, MTA and LIRR officials have said little publicly to assure riders that they are taking steps to address these problems to reprioritize passenger safety.  When the news first came out in late 2019, agency officials declined to comment on the ongoing investigation, and with this latest news, LIRR President Phillip Eng described Conklin's actions in comments to Newsday as "a betrayal of the public’s trust and put our customers’ and employees’ lives at risk", but did not elaborate any further on why LIRR management failed to identify this misconduct prior to the incident and what protocols have been put in place to prevent it from happening again.

MTA selects Siemens to build new Dual Mode locomotives

This week, Metro-North is seeking MTA Board approval to award a $335 million contract to Siemens Mobility for the design and manufacture of 27 new dual mode locomotives, the first in a new line of engines on a contract that includes options for up to 144 additional locomotives.  This is the culmination of a procurement started all the way back in the summer of 2018 and one that has encountered some significant delays during the process.  The MTA Board will be asked to vote on the proposed contract at its virtual December meeting this Wednesday.  

If the MTA Board approves the contract, the first pilot locomotive would be delivered about 50 months after award, which would not be until early 2025!  The remainder of the locomotives would be delivered at the rate of about one per month until the base order is complete in mid-2026 (with the options being delivered through early 2027).

Metro-North has been taking the lead on this procurement, and is advancing this purchase for only the first 27 locomotives using grants made available by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).  Because these types of grants are typically 'use it or lose it' with a certain expiration date, the MTA has been advancing award of certain projects even though award of new contracts through its capital program remains largely on hold indefinitely due to the financial impacts to the MTA from the COVID-19 pandemic.  These first 27 locomotives will replace one-for-one Metro-North's existing fleet of P32AC-DM Genesis locomotives, which were built back in the 1990's.

However, this first award is just the first step in what could be a long line of new dual modes.  If approved by the MTA Board, the contract would include 19 base order locomotives with options for up to 152 additional locomotives, including:

• up to 8 additional locomotives for Metro-North (being exercised now)
• up to 32 additional locomotives for Metro-North
• up to 66 locomotives for the LIRR
• up to 20 locomotives for the Connecticut Department of Transportation
• up to 26 locomotives for the NYS Department of Transportation

This represents today's full market for third-rail dual mode locomotives (ConnDOT locomotives would be purchased for use on the New Haven Line branches, and the NYS DOT is now responsible for financing new equipment purchases for state-supported Amtrak services in New York).  

It's important to note that these options only preserve the ability for these agencies to purchase a certain number of locomotives at an already fixed price at a later date—it is not guarantee nor does it create an obligation for them to do so.  So this means that while these four agencies could band together and replace the current dual modes with a single new design, one or more of the agencies can break away and do their own thing.

A DE and DM replacement in sight?

For the LIRR, this is an very interesting development.  Exercising the option on a Metro-North contract presents the cleanest and easiest path for replacing the current aging and problem-ridden DE and DM fleet.  But this is far from a sure thing—the railroad must make every effort to not repeat the same mistakes it did in the 1990's when it found itself in pretty much the same situation with the option to join the established Genesis procurement with Metro-North, ConnDOT, Amtrak, and VIA Rail Canada.  Last time, the LIRR misled the public and conjured up reasons to break away from the pack and go forward with an orphan procurement, selecting EMD to build the current feet of DM30AC locomotives—and we are still dealing with the consequences of that move to this day.

While I'm not saying jumping onto Metro-North's dual mode design should be the one and only course the LIRR considers, any contemplation or decision to go with an orphan procurement must be viewed with great skepticism.  The LIRR must be expected to make—openly and transparently—an overwhelming case for why going a different route would better for Long Island riders, if that's the path they ultimately seek.  These questionable locomotive procurement practices of the 1990's are not just an old fad—the railroad has been engaging in practices tantamount to bid rigging as recently as just a few years ago on a 2018 procurement for work locomotives.

Ultimately, LIRR officials have publicly said very little when it comes to their plans for replacing the DE and DM fleet.  While hopefully they will say at least something substantive this week, it will likely be a while longer before we get any sort of clarity.  The MTA and LIRR included funding for 12 new dual mode locomotives in the 2020-2024 Capital Program, which is now on hold indefinitely.  But the fact that the original program only funded 12 locomotives and not a full replacement/expansion of the existing DE and DM fleet shows that the railroad likely was not contemplating a full DE/DM replacement until well beyond 2025—and that was before the COVID-19 pandemic threw an enormous wrench in the MTA's financial situation.

Siemens Charger DM

Much like the P32AC-DM was a direct successor of the P40DC/P42DC locomotives mass produced for Amtrak's use nationwide, Metro-North's new dual mode (if awarded) would also be a direct successor to the ongoing Siemens Charger program, which has been in production since 2016.  These straight diesel locomotives are currently in operation or on order for a collection of state DOT's (IDOT, Caltrans, MDOT, MoDOT, WSDOT) for use on state-supported Amtrak corridors; for ACE, COASTER, and MARC for commuter service; for Brightline's higher-speed service in Florida; for Amtrak's National Network long distance trains; and for VIA Rail Canada.  Currently upwards of 200 of these locomotives are in service, in production, or on order.

Two Caltrans Charger locomotives (left and right) at San Deigo's Santa Fe Depot, with an outgoing Genesis locomotive in the center.  Metro-North's new dual mode will be a variant of these. (Photo: The LIRR Today) 

As part of the RFP process, Siemens did not bid the base specifications, instead their proposal included only an alternative design "based on [Siemens'] standard Charger locomotive platform already in operation and customized to meet what [Siemens] believed to be Metro-North's crucial technical requirements".  Metro-North spent 18 months negotiating with Siemens and reviewing the alternative design to come up with the ultimate specifications and the contract terms for the order.

The staff summary prepared for the MTA Board does not detail the technical specifications of the selected locomotives, but it's reasonable to assume that they would not be too different from the capabilities of the current Genesis DM's, the Siemens Chargers, or what was in the original RFP (which called for a locomotive that could push or pull up to 8 multilevel coaches at speeds of up to 90 mi/hr, and for the locomotives to be able to operate in electric mode whenever possible).  

Included in the original phase 1 RFP were several design options that could be included as part of the final contract, including:

• A diesel and DC third rail dual mode with a top speed of 110 mi/hr or 125 mi/hr (instead of 90 mi/hr)
• A diesel and AC overhead wire locomotive with a top speed of 110 mi/hr or 125 mi/hr (similar to NJTransit's ALP-45DP locomotives)
• A DC third rail and AC overhead wire motor (no diesel) that can run on 25 c/s 12.5 kV, 60 c/s 12.5 kV, and 60 c/s 25kV overhead wire

The staff summary again does not detail the specifics of what the options would be, only that the locomotives for the LIRR, ConnDOT, and NYS DOT would be "in an alternate configuration".  The alterations for LIRR could be as simple as installing different cab signaling equipment or something more substantial (though at this point, it seems like it would be wise to make the Metro-North and LIRR locomotives completely interoperable—including provisioning for both cab signal systems—that way they can be traded back and forth effortlessly to better accommodate seasonal demand, special events, unforeseen issues, etc.)

NYS DOT would likely be taking advantage of the first design option for a higher-speed locomotive, as the upper portions of the Empire Corridor to Albany can currently support train speeds of up to 110 mi/hr.  The other two options are unlikely to be used in this contract. 

The diesel/AC overhead wire design option was likely included as a placeholder or feeler for Amtrak in case they wanted to convert off-corridor NEC trains to all dual mode.  Presently, Springfield and Virginia Northeast Regional trains, the Carolinian, the Pennsylvanian, and the Vermonter operate with an electric locomotive on the NEC mainline and have that swapped for a diesel at either Washington, Philadelphia, or New Haven.  This takes time, requires effort, and inconveniences passengers when these swaps are made, and converting some or all of these trains to dual mode would allow these trains to switch into diesel mode and operate off the electrified NEC with just a press of a button, saving up to 30 minutes or more for through passengers.  This contract does not advance that effort, though given that all of the northeast state DOT's (VDOT, PennDOT, NCDOT, VTrans, MassDOT, and the NNEPRA) have not yet advanced plans for Genesis replacements, this door is still open.  Though there is still potentially an opening for this type of locomotive for regional/commuter rail purposes (see below).  All of the National Network long-distance trains that operate onto the NEC also do locomotive changes, though the idea of sending more expensive dual mode locomotives all the way to New Orleans, Chicago, or Miami for the sake of a 20 minute engine change at Washington doesn't seem like a great value proposition.  Both Amtrak and Vermont's Agency of Transportation are technically responsible for a tiny portion of the dual mode replacement program (for their Lake Shore Limited and Ethan Allen Express trains, respectively) though these are probably being taken care of as part of some horse trade with the NYS DOT, as going through all of the effort involved with purchasing one or two locomotives is a little too much.  Neither entity are directly involved in this contract.

The third design option for a dual motor was likely included by Metro-North in a similar vein as a placeholder/feeler.  Metro-North has reportedly been contemplating replacing its M-3A fleet with sets of bi-level coaches bracketed by electric locomotives, and a dual motor working on third rail and overhead wire would allow these trains to be operated anywhere in electrified territory (and beyond, even to the older AC overhead wire in use on the lower portion of the NEC).  Back in September, Metro-North issued an requests for expressions of interest for bi-level cars, giving credence to the idea that this plan was still at least on the table...though this contract does not appear to include these options at the moment.

Siemens may already be on their way to cracking the dual mode design challenge before the contract even gets out of the box.  The straight diesel Charger locomotives are based on the Siemens Vectron locomotives used widely throughout in Europe (the Charger is effectively the American version of the Vectron).  Late last year, Siemens completed their first dual mode Vectron, and they secured safety approvals from German authorities to operate the train in service just last month.  If the contract is approved, the new dual mode for Metro-North would likely be a marrying of the existing Charger and Vectron DM designs.

The major components of the Siemens Vectron DM operating in Germany (Rendering: Siemens)

Strength in numbers

For the time being, all that is being moved forward for MTA Board approval this week is a one-for-one replacement of the Genesis P32AC-DM locomotives that Metro-North currently owns.  However, if all of the options are fully exercised, it could represent an opportunity for a significant increase in dual mode services across the region.  Currently Metro-North, ConnDOT, the LIRR, and Amtrak have a total of 70 dual modes on their rosters.  Fully exercising the options would bring that to 171 locomotives, an increase of 101 dual modes: 

Railroad	Current DM's	New DM's	Additional options	Possible expansion
Metro-North	27	27	32	+32 (+119%)
ConnDOT	4	0	20	+16 (+400%)
LIRR	21	0	66	+45 (+214%)
Amtrak (now NYS DOT)	18	0	26	+8 (+44%)

The additional Metro-North options are true wildcards—they could be more third rail dual modes for expanding service on the upper Hudson and Harlem Lines.  Or it could be those dual motors for the M-3A replacements...replacing 138 M-3A's with bi-levels in 8 car trains would require about 14 trains and 28 locomotives, so that is plausible (though it would be a very tight shop margin).  The MTA also said previously they were considering purchasing 15 diesel Charger locomotives to replace the hodgepodge of old units in service on the West of Hudson lines, though purchasing dual modes for lines that are >98% unelectrified seems like an odd choice, given how Gateway and the proposed Bergen Loop remain at the very edge of the radar...though anything is possible.

ConnDOT's four dual modes are used in pool service with MNR
(Photo: Darienredsox)

ConnDOT's potential dramatic expansion in their dual mode fleet is particularly interesting.  Currently, ConnDOT is very short on dual modes, and the current schedule of four Danbury DM's means they need to utilize 100% of their locomotives every weekday (realistically, this means they need to borrow from the MTA every time one needs to be out of the rotation for servicing).  The dual mode trains are very popular, and the inability to add more has been a frequent point of frustration in Connecticut.  ConnDOT, which is fully responsible for the cost of operating the NHL branches, in addition to its CTrail services on the Hartford Line and Shore Line East, has long had big plans for the branches, but has consistently come up short on getting the funding to implement them.  Hourly dual modes on the Danbury Branch (similar to Poughkeepsie service) is probably a worthy and achievable goal, though that would only require about 8-10 dual modes with spares.  What are the rest for?  Are they looking to expand dual mode service to the Waterbury Branch or the Hartford Line?  While it would present interesting new opportunities, both the Naugatuck Valley and the Knowledge Corridor traditionally have a weaker connection to New York, and direct service doesn't seem worth the tradeoffs that come with slower push-pull trains (instead of buying quicker multiple units)...  Could the other design variants be coming into play?  ConnDOT has to purchase locomotives with MassDOT for Amtrak's Northeast Regional services between New Haven and Springfield, though I'm not entirely sure I see the value in going dual mode for that...at the time the equipment needs to be replaced, it seems it would be the best time to harmonize and eliminate the Amtrak/CTrail differentiations and have a single service operating between New Haven and Springfield with one type of equipment, instead of half Amtrak and half commuter.  Replacement of the Shore Line East equipment is also coming due, and the dual motor would allow for through service from New London to New York (though using M-8's on SLE would be a way better move).

A LIRR DM arriving at Southampton (The LIRR Today)

For the LIRR, this would also represent a significant expansion in the dual mode fleet.  While the railroad currently has a roughly even split of dual mode and regular diesel locomotives, I would be next time around they skip that differentiation and instead purchase an all dual mode fleet for the sake of commonality, which would mean the expansion is more on the order of 21 additional locomotives or a 47% increase.  Earlier this year, I wrote about the factors that have to be considered in the sizing of a new diesel fleet, and most of those questions/considerations remain true today.  A total of 66 locomotives is right around what my estimate was for a status quo scenario would require (only addressing the undersizing of the current fleet and filling in gaps in excess of the service standards, and assuming no ambitions to deliver material service improvements on the diesel branches and no real plan to dramatically increase dual mode service after East Side Access).  Further expansions in diesel service would likely require more locomotives:

Scenario	DM Loco	DE Loco	Total Loco	T/TT Cars	Cab Cars
Status quo	28	32	60	196	34
Modernizing service patterns (<25 min peak, <60 min o-pk)  —No electrification —PJN electrification —PJN + PGE electrification —PJN + PGE + OBY electrification	38 20 18 18	51 39 32 18	89 59 50 36	274 167 134 107	39 30 23 13
Full electrification	24	0	24	108	0

The largest variable is, of course, expansions in electrification.  If the LIRR expands electrification, then dual modes are of course less important.  There's significant support for expanding electrification on Long Island, and the benefits of EMU's over push-pull diesel trains are clear and obvious.  When it comes to truly modernizing the LIRR, there's probably no better bang for the capital bucks than expanding electrification.

NYS DOT's 26 option locomotives also represent a nice expansion in fleet size.  It's actually likely the perfect amount—in the example Empire Service improvements I wrote about over the summer, I figured that hourly service between Albany and Ronkonkoma, two additional round-trips west of Albany, and three additional round-trips on the Ethan Allen Express north of Albany would require a total of 25 locomotives.  Add one or two for the Lake Shore Limited gives a total of 26 or 27 locomotives with spares—right in the sweetspot.  This does not necessarily mean that the state is gearing up for such a big boost in Empire Corridor service, but it is very encouraging. 

An uncompetitive procurement

The fact that all of these potential new locomotives are included as future options and are not being advanced now as part of a base order gives the railroads more time to consider their future fleet needs—but this indecision is not without consequence, and it may end up costing us all more in the long run. 

The MTA's rolling stock procurements are often extreemly expensive, and markedly more than what is seen elsewhere in the world.  Part of this is definitely due to the unique and borderline byzantine specifications it imposes, which means pretty much everything has to be custom built for the MTA.  This is definitely true for the subways, and the FRA's old crashworthiness regulations required US rail equipment to be built to completely different standards than off-the-shelf European or Asian train designs (these regulations have since been amended to allow for trains built to Euronorms to be used in the US with only light modifications).  The US railcar market has become increasingly oligopic over the years, as there are only a handful of manufacturers that have the ability to set up facilities and develop a whole fleet design basically from scratch each time for a one-time order.  Cross-agency cooperation where you have giant orders like we saw with the Genesis or are seeing with the Chargers are literally a once every two or three decades thing.  That requires a lot of production capacity in a short period of time, with the risk for lots of down time between contracts.  Oh, and most of the time those factories have to be in the United States and they can't use existing factories in Europe or Asia.

You can count all of the major players in the US rail equipment industry on one hand (and with the recent merger of Alstom and Bombardier, there is now one less).  Less competition means higher prices, as companies can be more comfortable packing larger margins into their numbers.  Doing any sort of business with the MTA almost always includes an additional "MTA premium", too.  The MTA has consistently struggled to maximize competition, especially when it comes to fleet procurements.

An MPXpress locomotive on New Mexico's Rail Runner
(Photo: VonTasha)

This new dual mode effort was especially uncompetitive.  Just three locomotive builders expressed interest and passed the first phase of the RFP's qualification evaluation: Bombardier, MotivePower (MPI), and Siemens.  The MTA has put Bombardier on its naughty list over the delays and safety problems with the R179 fleet for NYCT; MPI's MPXpress line of passenger locomotives could have been a formidable opponent, though they may have had issues condensing all of the equipment down into a package that fits inside the northeast's tunnels (MPI's locomotives mainly run on railroads out west, where size restrictions are much less of a concern, and are therefore more than a foot taller than today's DM's); and then of course Siemens was in the best position. 

But when it came time to submit the final proposals, only one bid was received (from Siemens).  Both Bombardier and MPI ultimately declined to bid, indicating a lack of interest in the procurement due to the small base quantity of locomotives requested, the inability to provide a competitive price, and the inability to comply with Federal requirements.  Here is where the railroads' indecision is likely going to cost us all big in the long run...  Because equipment procurements have significant fixed costs for the design and testing of the equipment, small orders are incredibly expensive, as those fixed costs can't be spread over as many units.  This is exacerbated by the fact that Siemens already had a working diesel locomotive model that met all of the requirements—their fixed costs were already going to be significantly lower, as all they needed to do was tweak their existing design, not start from scratch.  Had the agencies come to the table with a coordinated plan and committed to the full order upfront, Bombardier and MPI may have had a better chance at being competitive, helping keep everyone's prices lower.

Having only a single bidder is never considered a good practice in any contracting effort, and especially when the public's money is involved.  Without the nuisance of competition, the sole supplier effectively gets a free pass to run up the price...and this is especially true in this case once the MTA let the tables to be turned on itself, leaving it to negotiate with a vendor on a proposed alternative design, instead of the other way around as it typically should.  Every little request or modification from MNR presented an opportunity for the sole supplier to pump up the price and pad their margins, at our expense.

Sticker shock

These new locomotives are, naturally, really expensive.  The initial 19 base order locomotives are priced at $12.2 million each, and the first 8 option locomotives are priced at $10.3 million each.  The staff summary being presented to the MTA Board does not give the pricing for the remaining contract options...but if they are at a similar price, this is likely close to a $2 billion contract overall.

At an average price of $11.6 million per locomotive, the new dual modes would be priced well in excess of what we have seen before.  LIRR's original 23 DM locomotives cost $3.9 million each in 1995...adjusting that for inflation, they would cost $6.7 million in today's dollars (a 73% price premium).  The new dual modes are comparable in price to NJT's ALP-45DP's (26 locomotives for €6.85 million each in 2008...$11.9 million each adjusted for currency and inflation effects), though those were truly a brand new design in the US market, and were for a much smaller order than this (so it had an incredibly high fixed cost split over a much smaller number of units).

The Siemens Vectron DM is the future Charger DM's
European cousin, but it costs one-quarter the price (Siemens)

Compared to off-the-shelf DM's elsewhere in the world, these locomotives are extreemly expensive.  Despite dual mode passenger operations being rare outside North America (where there is a much wider adoption of electrification, even in very rural areas), the few examples that do exist are all much cheaper.  Swifambo Rail in South Africa purchased 70 EuroDual locomotives for €3.6 million each in 2013 ($5.4 million each adjusted for currency and inflation effects), which is less than half the cost of what the MTA be paying.  Germany's chief freight operator DB Cargo just signed a huge €1 billion order for 400 Siemens Vectron DM locomotives in September.  That works out to about $3.0 million per locomotive, meaning the MTA would be paying almost four times as much for a comparable design.

Even the premium for a dual mode locomotive over a straight diesel is increasing.  A regular diesel Charger locomotive costs about $7.0 million each, meaning that a dual mode Charger would cost a whopping 65% more than the diesel only version...  This is a much wider premium than what we saw with the DE and DM locomotives in the 1990's—back then, the LIRR paid about 43% more per locomotive for the dual mode functionality.

A major milestone

If the Siemens contract is approved by the MTA Board this week, it will be the first major step in an effort to replace the region's fleet of aging dual mode locomotives that will likely take most of this decade to see through.  While the Siemens Charger design is not without its flaws, early indications have been generally positive regarding its performance...and hopefully that will carry through to this new dual mode variant.  We have seen for most of the last decade the pain and suffering that poor diesel fleet reliability and limited capacity can inflict on passengers, and it's important to not repeat the same mistakes of prior fleet planning fumbles.  

At least initially, the agencies don't seem to be setting themselves up to be short on locomotives by planning for a generous increase in the size of their dual mode fleets.  But the very high cost is a major issue, and that may end up requiring agencies to cut corners and drop locomotives as funding is liable to become even scarcer in the coming years.